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Nearly a century after “after it officially began, the contest between capitalism and socialism is over: 
capitalism has won” (Heilbroner 1989: 98). Socialism “was the tragic failure of the twentieth century” 
(Heilbroner 2008). Even social democracy and the mixed economy have proven unsustainable, at least, in their 
most ambitious forms, as nationalized industries in Great Britain and France have gone bankrupt (Yergin and 
Stanislaw 2002) and welfare states have discovered they cannot afford their unfunded liabilities (Creveld 1999). 
Several of the more profligate European states have been forced to pursue austerity programs in order to pare 
down their debt to manageable levels, and the neoliberal Washington Consensus has insisted on similar 
conditions for aid to developing countries in Latin America. 
But we cannot complacently assume that the relevant lessons have been learned forever more. “Those 
who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it,” as Santyana said. Today's 26 year old PhD candidates 
were born in 1990, just barely prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. College freshmen were in born in 1998, 
and by the time they are entering college today, a quarter of a century will have passed since the Soviet Union 
ceased to be. They have no personal memories of actually existing socialism, if we do not teach them why 
socialism failed, they will have no reason to believe it should not be tried again. They might not even realize 
they are trying anything “again”; if we do not educate them better, they might not even realize socialism was 
ever tried before. None of our students will know anything about socialism except what we teach them. 
Therefore, we must ensure we understand why socialism failed. We cannot teach our students the lessons to be 
learned from history unless we have learned them ourselves. Therefore, the failure of socialism deserves a 
restatement.
This essay is an exercise in political theory, exploring the political-institutional reasons why democratic 
socialism or economic democracy must necessarily fail to accomplish the aims and intentions of its advocates. It 
is not an exercise in economic theory, and it does not attempt to show whether socialism must fail for purely 
economic reasons. That argument has been made elsewhere, in the Austrian literature on the impossibility of 
economic calculation under socialism (Hayek 1935; Hayek 1948: 77-91, 119-208; Brutzkus 1935; Mises 1981 
[1922]: 95-194; Hoff 1981 [1938]; Leoni 2009 [1965]; Lavoie 1985a; Lavoie 1985b; Steele 1992; de Soto 2010; 
Boettke 1998; Boettke 2012: 76-96, 226-240). For the sake of argument, this essay assumes that there is no 
problem of rational economic calculation under socialism. As far as is this essay is concerned, the Lange-Lerner-
Taylor solution of market socialism might as well have successfully refuted Mises's, Hayek's, and Rothbard's 
claim that rational economic calculation is impossible under socialism. What this essay will argue is that 
democratic socialism must fail, not necessarily because it is socialist, but because it is democratic. Even if 
socialism were economically feasible, it cannot be successfully institutionalized by democratic means and still 
accomplish its goals. Even if it were possible to implement an economically rational form of socialism, its 
political institutions could not be democratic and it could not promise to safeguard individual rights and liberties 
against government abuse. 
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Furthermore, not only is democratic socialism unable to promise liberty, but democratic socialism is not 
compatible with Lange's market socialism either. Even if we concede for the sake of argument – as this essay 
does – that Lange et. al. successfully refuted Mises and Hayek, this essay will demonstrate that market socialism 
is institutionally incompatible with economic democracy. In other words: the claim is not that democratic 
socialism cannot economically calculate, but that democratic socialism is politically distinct from market 
socialism in such a way that previous attempts to show that market socialism can calculate are inapplicable to 
democratic socialism. This means that advocates of democratic socialism must craft a new refutation of Mises 
and Hayek that does not rely on Lange et. al. This does not necessarily mean that democratic socialism cannot 
economically calculate, but it means that all previous attempts to show that it can are inapplicable and that Mises 
and Hayek must be refuted anew.
This criticism of democratic socialism will largely follow the arguments of F. A. Hayek's Road to 
Serfdom (2007 [1944]) and John Jewkes's New Ordeal by Planning (1968 [1948]). Their arguments, made quite 
long ago, differ crucially from more recent criticisms of market socialism by Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. 
Vishny in their well-cited 1994 article, “The Politics of Market Socialism.” Although the target of Shleifer's and 
Vishny's criticism is market socialism, their arguments apply equally well to democratic socialism. Shleifer and 
Vishny utilize basic Public Choice to argue that market socialism would be susceptible to the inefficiencies of 
rent-seeking because politicians cannot be sufficiently incentivized to promote economically efficient resource 
allocation – and we add, this applies even more to democratic socialism. But Hayek and Jewkes went beyond 
Shleifer's and Vishny's (correct) argument that political officials will misuse their power and be insufficiently 
incentivized. While the Hayek-Jewkes argument is – like the Shleifer-Vishny argument – a form of Public 
Choice (Boettke 1995) – in that applies economics to political theory – it is Public Choice of a rather different 
sort. The Hayek-Jewkes argument, being different from the more thoroughly cited Shleifer-Vishny criticism, 
deserves a restatement as well. 
According to Hayek (2007 [1944]) and Jewkes (1968 [1948]), advocates of democratic socialism fail to 
understand how their political system will actually operate in practice. They use economic analysis to criticize 
the political institutional logic of democratic socialism (Boettke 1995 re: Hayek). Meanwhile, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1994) concentrate more on how the reality of practical politics will spoil any attempt to enact authentic 
market socialism. Thus, both sets of scholars – Hayek-Jewkes and Shleifer-Vishny – undertake a Public Choice 
criticism of socialist schemes, but in different ways. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1994), market socialism 
will fail to foster suitable incentives for good political behavior, and it will give rise to too much economic 
inefficiency. But according to Hayek and Jewkes , the problem is more profound: democracy is fundamentally 
incompatible with socialism on the most basic, essential level. Hayek and Jewkes argue, not that politicians will 
abuse their power or that socialism will give rise to economic inefficiency, but that democracy and socialism are 
fundamentally incompatible, and therefore, that democratic socialism is logically incoherent. The political and 
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economic systems simply do not match up in any coherent fashion.
It should be realized that what Hayek-Jewkes and Shleifer-Vishny really criticize is not redistribution of 
income by high levels of taxation, but command-and-control regulation and government ownership of the means 
of production. Hayek's Road to Serfdom (2007 [1944]) criticized the British Labour Party's policy of 
nationalization, and Hayek was inspired by the de facto nationalization-by-regulation accomplished by the 
National Socialist regime in Germany.1 Hayek was not primarily concerned with high levels of taxation and 
redistribution of income such as we might find in Sweden. As Bruce Caldwell notes (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 30f.), 
“[T]he existence of such states [i.e. welfare states], and whatever successes they may or may not have had, does 
not undermine Hayek’s logical argument from The Road to Serfdom: a welfare state is not socialism.”2 This is 
because taxation and redistribution of income do not interfere with the operation of the price system the way 
command-and-control does.3 As Wilhelm Röpke (1992 [1942]: 260; cf. 1987 [1951]: 7f.) – an ordo-liberal 
closely aligned with Hayek – said,
we find that a differentiation between two groups of state intervention is of foremost 
importance, for which we have suggested the terms “compatible” and “incompatible” 
interventions: i.e. those that are in harmony with an economic structure based on the market, and 
those which are not. Interventions which do not interfere with the price mechanism and with the 
automatism of the market derived from it are compatible, they let themselves be absorbed as 
new “data”; interventions which paralyse the price mechanism and therefore force us to replace 
it by a planned (collectivist) order, we call incompatible. 
Because taxation and subsidy do not entail the same degree of command-and-control as does regulation, 
therefore, the example of Sweden does not refute Hayek (pace Samuelson in Farrant and McPhail 2009: 5, 9, 11, 
12). The Swedish system relied and still relies predominately on redistribution of income, with relatively little 
regulation or nationalization (Stein 1991, Sanandaji 2011).4 Fittingly, Lawson and Clark (2010: 235) note that 
according to their empirical analysis,5
the Hayek–Friedman hypothesis [that economic liberty is a necessary precondition for political 
liberty] is confirmed most strongly when looking at the legal structure and property rights and 
the regulation areas of the EFW [Economic Freedom of the World] index. These two areas are 
more closely identified with political and civil liberties than the other areas of the EFW index 
(fiscal size of government, monetary policy, and trade policy).
Not all government interventions in the economy are equally likely to lead us along the road to serfdom. Hence, 
when I speak of “socialism,” I have a very specific meaning in mind: nationalization and central planning, or 
else command-and-control regulation so extensive that it begins to approach nationalization and central 
planning.6 This was the classical meaning of “socialism” as intended by socialists themselves. Fundamentally, 
what socialism so defined means is the abolition or severe restriction of the price system.
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Now in fact, we have overstated the case, and we must admit this strict dichotomy between taxation and 
command-and-control is not entirely accurate. A tax is a command-and-control except that a given action is 
punished by confiscating money instead of by imprisoning the offender. Put differently, both taxation and 
criminalization work by altering incentives, except that the one imposes a much stronger disincentive than the 
other. Both tobacco taxes and marijuana criminalization disincentive the use of these respective drugs and so 
they are forms of command-and-control. In fact, most regulations resemble taxes insofar as they are generally 
enforced through monetary fines, not criminal imprisonment. Thus, taxes are a form of command-and-control, 
and Mises (1981 [1922]: 230) is therefore able to speak of one particular socialist scheme as follows:
Directly or indirectly through its taxation policy, it [the socialist state] determines the conditions 
of labour, moves capital and labour from one branch of industry to another . . . These tasks 
falling to the State are the only important ones and they constitute the essence of economic 
control.
Nevertheless, the distinction between taxation and command-and-control is still important. Not all taxes are 
equally command-like, for it depends on what sort of disincentive is created. There is no such thing as a value-
free tax which does not affect incentives at all, but some taxes are more value-free than others. For example, a 
flat per-capita tax on all citizens would not entail as much command-and-control as an income tax because there 
is less disincentive. A person is taxed a fixed number of dollars simply for being alive. Such a flat, per-capita tax 
would not encourage or discourage any specific behaviors, and so it would not be very command-like, although 
it would still affect a person's choice of trade-off between labor and leisure trade-off due to the income and 
substitution effects. A flat per-capita tax is not completely value-free, but it is probably the most value-free tax 
imaginable. It is difficult to translate a flat per-capita tax into a command of the form “thou shalt” do anything in 
particular. But a fixed-percentage income tax affects incentives more than a per-capita tax, and so it is more 
command-like. A progressive income tax is still more command-like. Each of these taxes respectively 
approximates more and more to commands along the lines of, “thou shalt labor less than before because the 
marginal return to labor has decreased” or “thou shalt labor more than before in order to recoup lost income.” 
Eventually we reach the realm of taxes on highly specific activities and products, such as tobacco taxes or taxes 
on particular sources of income irrespective of their magnitudes. These are extremely command-like. A tax on 
tobacco is substantially similar to a command, “thou shalt not smoke (as often).” Likewise, a tariff is similar to 
the command, “thou shalt shift away from foreign goods and toward domestic goods.”
Recall that according to Hayek (2007 [1944]: 112-23), the rule of law entails general, abstract rules 
which apply to everyone equally such that we cannot predict in advance who will be affected specifically. This 
stands in contrast, Hayek says, to a regime where particular rules apply specifically to different people and 
different activities. Hayek argued that socialism cannot operate without abandoning general, abstract rules in 
favor of particular ones. Here, we note that some taxes and regulations are more general or particular than others, 
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violating Hayek's concept of the rule-of-law differently. Therefore, the distinction between taxation and 
command-and-control regulation should be understood as a continuum, with some taxes being more or less 
command-like. For example, a tax of 1% on a product might barely make a difference in a person's life, while a 
10,000% tax on all motor vehicles might virtually amount to a command to use the horse-and-buggy. Hayek's 
argument in the Road to Serfdom – or at least, the argument of this paper – should be understood to apply more 
to command-and-control regulations and to taxes which are substantially command-like, violating the generality 
and non-discrimination of the rule-of-law. This argument therefore applies less to e.g. the Swedish system, where 
high income taxes are accompanied by a substantial degree of protection of private property, a low level of 
regulation, and freedom of international commerce. Thus, we insist on our previous statement that by socialism, 
we mean either nationalization or else an extensive degree of command-and-control regulation, not a system of 
taxation and redistribution which is not very command-like. 
Above all, it is crucial to understand that Hayek's argument is a contingent one, and whether a given tax 
or regulation will lead us down the road to serfdom depends on precisely whether and how that tax or regulation 
will force people to live their lives differently than they otherwise would have, and also how compatible a given 
intervention is with the functioning of the price system – meaning, whether consumption, production, and 
employment are free to adjust themselves to whatever prices turn out to be, or whether the government demands 
a given pattern of consumption, production, and employment regardless of whatever prices turn out to be.
The essay proceeds as follows: section I briefly summarizes and evaluates some of the statements and 
policies put forth by advocates of democratic socialism. Section II summarizes Shleifer and Vishny (1994). 
Section III, the heart of this paper, explores in detail the arguments of Hayek and Jewkes. Section III is divided 
into several parts: part (1) notes the mutual relationship and relative neglect of Hayek and Jewkes; (2) 
categorizes the nature of their argument; (3) concerns the impossibility of separating political from economic 
freedom, with the implication that economic planning – even of the democratic sort – requires coercively 
planning every aspect of individual people's lives, defeating the purpose of democracy; (4) studies the notion of 
democracy as a means to limiting political power, not an end unto itself, and what this means for democratic 
socialism; (5) discusses the impossibility of arriving, by consensus, at a single, unitary agreed-upon plan; (6) 
builds on the previous section and compares the different effects and consequences of interest group lobbying 
and rent-seeking according to Shleifer-Vishny on the one hand and Hayek-Jewkes on the other; (7) notes the 
difficulty posed by democratic elections which might disrupt the operation of a socialist central-plan.and finally, 
(8) notes the problem which socialism creates for international economic order and how planning would give 
rise to belligerency, militancy, and xenophobia. Section IV concludes that democracy, as a political framework, 
is incompatible with the aims of socialist economic planning.
I. THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS
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A singular difficulty in evaluating democratic socialism is that it is not always clear from what the 
advocates themselves say, which specific political and economic system they have in mind. They have plenty to 
say in criticism of capitalism and the market economy and about the egalitarian ethics which motivate their 
criticism, but they are far less precise about the details of the system they would have replace capitalism. 
Recently, the editors of Dissent magazine (Dissent 2015) decided to “present a selection of key essays on 
democratic socialism from [their] archives.” To avoid bias, this essay will follow largely follow Dissent's lead 
and predominately characterize democratic socialism according to the essays chosen by those editors, to wit: 
Howe and Coser (1954), Denitch (1978), Harrington (1978a), Phillips (1997), Heilbroner (1978a), Coser (1978). 
and Walzer (1978, 2010). In essence, we will let the editors of Dissent define democratic socialism for us. We 
will also refer occasionally to several other authors where it seems appropriate, including Archer (1995), 
Schweickart (1992), Burczak (2006, 2011), Dahl (1985), and to several works by George Orwell.
Irving Howe and Lewis Coser (1954) devote most of their essay (1954: 122-131) to a discussion of the 
Marxist criticism of utopian socialism. Only approximately the third quarter (1954: 131-135) lays out something 
approximating a concrete plan. The remainder of the essay (1954: 136-138) deals with the nature of work and 
leisure under socialism. Unfortunately, this sketch is not altogether clear. Howe and Coser note (1954: 133) that 
“a great deal of traditional socialist thought has stressed economic centralization as a prerequisite for planning” 
but that “[w]hatever the historical validity of these emphases on centralism, they must now be abandoned.” 
Instead, they propose “small decentralized industrial units” and “relatively small economic units.” The reason for 
this is that (Howe and Coser 1954: 134; cf. Denitch 1978: 354f.)
The presence of numerous political and economic units, living together in a tension of 
cooperation-and-conflict, seems the best “guarantee” that power will not accumulate in the 
hands of a managerial oligarchy
But however large or small these industrial units are, they still require central direction from the state. Howe and 
Coser say (1954: 134) their policy 
implies a considerable modification of the familiar socialist emphasis on nationalization of the 
means of production, increase of productivity, a master economic plan, etc.—a modification but 
not a total rejection. To be sure, socialism still presupposes the abolition of private property in 
the basic industries.
Thus, their scheme still relies on nationalization and political planning. On the other hand, they state that this 
“requires only a loose guiding direction, a general pointer from above” (Howe and Coser 1954: 134), without 
explaining what this really means. Nevertheless, it seems clear that what Howe and Coser have in mind is 
socialism of the classical sort – viz. state ownership and direction of the means of production – and not of the 
newer, Scandinavian sort – i.e. basically free-markets with large transfer payments. 
In addition, Howe and Coser (1954: 134) and Bogdan Denitch (1978) endorse some sort of guild 
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socialism / syndicalism / workplace democracy, but they do not seem aware that workplace democracy 
essentially translates to free-market capitalism where the shareholders of a firm happen to be the firm's 
employees. In other words, under workplace democracy, the workers own the firms, but the firms compete with 
each other on the free-market in a typically capitalist fashion. Therefore, it is not clear how this is reconcilable 
with nationalization and centralized direction of the economy or any other canons of socialism. As Don Lavoie 
(1985a: 127) notes,
Workers' control of the means of production appears to represent the long-range goal of these 
democratic socialists, but not much is said about what this entails concretely; neither is it ever 
explained why workers' control over their workplace should require, or even be consistent with, 
national economic planning.
Furthermore, some firms will be more profitable than others, and so the workers who own those firms 
will obtain higher incomes than the workers who own less profitable firms (Mises 1981 [1922]: 238, 242; cf. 
Caplan n.d. #1). Hence, workplace democracy is incompatible with egalitarianism too. And if income is 
nationally (or internationally) redistributed to achieve an equal outcome, then the workers do not really own their 
firms anymore. That is to say, if workers of a given firm obtain the same equal income regardless of which firm 
they own and irrespective of whether they operate their firm at a profit or a loss – regardless of any decisions 
they democratically make, in fact – then there is little sense sense in which the workers really do own their firm.
Moreover, it may be that many workers do not want to own a significant stake in their firm, for they may 
be happier drawing a steady, reliable salary than uncertain, variable profit. Workplace democracy entails that 
workers take on the role of entrepreneur who earns a profit – or crucially, a loss – depending on the accuracy of 
their entrepreneurial speculation and foresight. It may be that many workers do not wish to be mere residual 
claimants. Instead, they may wish to draw salaries even when the firm incurs losses. As Lavoie (1985a: 128) 
says, mandatory workplace democracy entails “forcing workers – who may not want to take on the risk, expense, 
and responsibility involved in managing a firm – to do so anyway.” 
Besides, in a free-market, it is already legal for workers to establish a firm which they will own 
themselves, or for them to purchase a controlling share in the firm's stock (cf. Lavoie 1985a: 127).7 For example, 
Archer (1995)'s version of workplace democracy specifies that workers or their representative labor movement 
purchase a controlling stake in the firm from the firm's owners through a series of mutually-acceptable 
compromises; hence, there is no act of expropriation which is inconsistent with free-market capitalism. 
Meanwhile, Schweickart (1992: 28-36) argues at length that in general, worker-management will be more 
efficient than traditional management. But if this were the case, then we ought to expect investors will invest 
more in worker-managed firms so that they earn a higher return than if they invested in traditionally managed 
firms (cf. Steele 1992: 323-349). Similarly, if workers preferred the combination of wages and working 
conditions offered by workplace democracy, then we would expect capitalists, competing with each other for 
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scarce labor, to cater to these workers' demands (cf. Steele 1992: 323-349). Thus, it is not clear why an embrace 
of workplace democracy requires a rejection of capitalism. The capitalist utopia already includes the socialist 
utopia as a voluntary option for those who desire it (Brennan 2014: 94-98).8 In general, capitalism allows the 
private institutions of civil society to be as democratic as their members wish them to be. For example, the 
mutual aid societies which preceded the modern welfare state were often organized on a democratic basis and 
they gave their members a significant opportunity to exercise responsibility and to hold authority in a way which 
proved educational and which helped them build character (Green 1993). If democracy is demanded because it 
promotes civic virtue, this demand can be accommodated under capitalism with little if any government 
intervention. 
Some authors (e.g. Dahl 1985 – see Green 1986; Burczak 2006, 2011) would reply that workplace 
democracy should be made mandatory; firms should be compelled to submit to worker control. Others would say 
that the government should “encourage” workplace democracy (cf. Lavoie 1985a: 127). But this would merely 
entail an interventionist form of capitalism: excepting the imposition of ad hoc regulations, the private worker-
owned firms would continue to freely compete with each other in a marketplace (Burczak 2006, 2011), and some 
firms – and therefore, their employees – would be more profitable and prosperous than others (Mises 1981 
[1922]: 238, 242; cf. Caplan n.d. #1). This is not socialism, but merely interventionism. Whether a policy 
mandating or encouraging this arrangement is a good idea is debatable,9 but such a policy is conceivable only 
under capitalism.10 In fact, Theodore Burczak (2006, 2011) advocates mandatory workplace democracy as the 
only acceptable form of socialism precisely precisely because it is otherwise compatible with free-market 
capitalism and avoids Hayek's criticisms of central-planning.11 Hence, when Howe and Coser (1954: 134) and 
Denitch (1978) advocate workplace democracy, it is not clear why this is an example of socialism and not 
merely a modified form of capitalism (cf. Lavoie 1985a: 127)d.
Michael Harrington's plan (1978a) is similarly muddled. He aims to move “beyond the welfare state” 
(Harrington 1978a: 440, 451) and to “transfer the control of basic investment decisions from private boardrooms 
to the democratic process” (Harrington 1978a: 442). He explicitly advocates state direction of the economy, 
calling for “a national planning process in which all the people would have an effective right to participate” 
(Harrington 1978a: 442, emphasis in original). On the other hand, despite his intent to “move beyond the welfare 
state,” he envisions “three main types of economic organization: socially owned; privately owned large 
enterprises; and cooperatives” (Harrington 1978a: 446). So there will be privately-owned firms as well as 
worker-owned firms, both of which must compete on the market with government-owned firms. It is not clear 
how this is different from the regulated, mixed economy which Harrington has rejected. With Harrington's 
confusing eclecticism, “one almost gets the impression that a shotgun tactic is deliberately being used here” 
(Lavoie 1985a: 151 re: Carnoy and Shearer). 
In any case, according to Harrington, wherever a conflict arises between the private firms and the central 
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plan, the latter will take priority: “individual enterprises or industries cannot be given the right to veto the 
democratic plans of the entire nation” (Harrington 1978a: 447). At the same time, Harrington believes that 
competition among state-owned firmed will curb any abuse of power (Harrington 1978a: 448); he does not 
explain how state-owned and democratically-directed firms can be made to compete against each other when a 
democratic plan commands the private firms what they must do and how. Harrington fails to realize that unlike 
market competition, political rivalry simply means a zero-sum competition for monopoly status; political actors 
merely vie for exclusive receipt of special privilege, with none of the benefits of market competition accruing to 
anybody (Lavoie 1985a: 135f., 140).
A key indication of Harrington's confusion is his approving citation of Oskar Lange (1938)'s market 
socialism (Harrington 1978a: 443f.), which he fails to realize is incompatible with democratic socialism. 
Harrington admits that according to Ludwig von Mises (1920), rational economic cost accounting is impossible 
under socialism. But he summarily replies that Mises has been refuted by Oskar Lange's market socialism 
socialism. Harrington does not seem aware, however, of the fact that market socialism is fundamentally 
incompatible with democratic socialism. According to Lange, socialism can calculate if the government's 
officials follow strict, non-discretionary rules of cost-accounting. Essentially, the socialist government's officials 
are to perform the same sorts of calculations which a Neoclassical economics professor performs on the 
classroom blackboard, such as expanding output until marginal revenue equals marginal cost, etc. Market 
socialism, according to Lange, is meant to imitate the market, or more properly, market socialism is to replicate 
what the market would do under conditions of perfect competition. “Thus,” Lange (1938: 82) says, “the 
accounting prices in a socialist economy, far from being arbitrary, have quite the same objective character as the 
market prices in a regime of competition. . . . Our study of the determination of equilibrium prices in a socialist 
economy has shown that the process of price determination is quite analogous to that in a competitive market.” 
There is no room in Lange's system for any democratic input or discretion. The government's officials 
are to determine the solutions to simultaneous differential equations by a method of trial-and-error, adjusting 
parametrized prices until quantity supplied equals quantity demanded. Lange's goal is for the government to 
discover the single optimal equilibrium set of prices and outputs. The government's officials could be chosen 
democratically if this is desired, but it makes no fundamental difference whether they are democratically chosen 
or not, because all the officials do is follow strict rules of accounting.12 But according to Harrington, the goal of 
democratic socialism is to “transfer the control of basic investment decisions from private boardrooms to the 
democratic process” (Harrington 1978a: 442). Hence, what Harrington requires is the very opposite of Lange's 
strict rules of accounting without discretion. Harrington requires that “we the people” will be able to obtain 
whatever “we” want from the government and from the economy, whereas Lange's goal is for the government to 
discover a single, indisputable mathematical equilibrium which is immune from political clamouring. Harrington 
seeks to maximize democratic discretion while Lange aims to abolish all discretion; the two systems are seeking 
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very different outcomes.13 
Schweickart (1992) also makes precisely the same mistake as Harrington in his defense of economic 
democracy, and for this reason, Scheickart's system is difficult to criticize as well. Like Harrington, Scheickart 
(1992: 11) appeals to Lange to refute Mises, unaware that economic democracy and market socialism are 
antithetical. Schweickart (1992: 19) speaks of “worker self-managed market socialism,” implying a system 
where workers are responsible for implementing Lange's strict, non-discretionary rules of cost-accounting. It is 
not clear why it is preferable for workers to implement these rules rather than trained accountants. Then he 
speaks a “democratic, market-conforming plan” (Schweickart 1992: 19), unaware of the fact that a plan cannot 
be simultaneously democratic and market-conforming. Schweickart (1992: 20 n. 7) specifies that wage 
differentials will be restricted in order to limit income inequality, but this is incompatible with market socialism, 
which specifies that wages are to be determined by the Neoclassical economic law of marginal productivity 
(Lange 1938: 83). And while Schweickart specifies a market economy wherein worker-managed firms must 
compete with each other on the basis of free-market prices determined by supply and demand (1992: 19, 21), he 
also dictates that investment will be socially determined by a democratic process (1992: 19, 22). But which is it? 
These two components of the scheme are incompatible. And if investment is socially determined, by what 
method will calculation be determined to be economically rational, i.e. how will the system ensure that ends are 
achieved with the least cost, so that as many ends can be simultaneously achieved as possible? When any end is 
achieved at higher cost than is necessary, then more of another end must be sacrificed than was necessary. This is 
the essence of the problem of economic calculation, which applies under all systems, both capitalist and 
socialist. Furthermore, Schweickart (1992: 22) declares that labor costs are not to be accounted for, but 
according to Lange (1938: 83)'s market socialism, labor costs are as real as any other costs, and rational 
economic calculation requires that labor be economically allocated and conserved. The same laws of rational 
economic calculation apply to all systems, both market-based and socialist. In general, Schweickart appears to 
have no understanding at all of the meaning and significance of the problem of economic calculation. It is 
difficult to criticize Schweickart's system because it is so amorphous, indeterminate, and incoherent.
Therefore, Harrington and Schweikart cannot appeal to Lange to refute Mises's thesis of the 
impossibility of economic calculation under socialism, because Lange's solution to Mises's problem is 
incompatible with Harrington's and Schweickart's institutions and goals. Hence, Harrington and Schweichkart 
must refute Mises themselves, and show how a democratic, majoritarian planning process could succeed in 
economically rational cost-accounting. Don Lavoie (1985a: 125-171) has shown this is impossible. But as this is 
an essay in political theory, not economic theory, we do not wish to subject democratic socialism too much to the 
criticism of economic price-theory. Our point is simply that the murky and muddled nature of Harrington's and 
Schweickart's proposals is indicated by the fact that he has approvingly cited someone – viz. Lange – whose 
scheme is diametrically opposed to his own. Of course, this murkiness works to Harrington's and Schweickart's 
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advantages because it is much more difficult to criticize what cannot be grasped.
Nevertheless, in the end, Harrington does appear to endorse some form of planning, regardless of how 
democratic it is. For elsewhere he states (1978b: 356), “The socialist essential, it must always be remembered, is 
not the plan; it is the democratic power of the people over the plan and the planners.” And further (1978b: 357), 
“What must be done—in theory and in practice—is to counterpose democratic planning to command planning.” 
Harrington does, after all, call for a form of government planning of the economy, albeit democratic rather than 
imposed by a hierarchical elite. Compared to Soviet-style planning, what Harrington wishes to change is not 
what is done but merely by whom it is done. This point must be emphasized. Discussing democratic socialists in 
general, Lavoie (1985a: 135) notes “their insistence that the planning they advocate must be decentralized, or 
'from the bottom up,' rather than centralized, or 'from the top down.'” Lest one mistakenly believe that such 
decentralized planning implies a rejection of government planning, Lavoie (ibid.) immediately adds, “it must be 
clarified that these writers do believe there will have to be one central office that will have to oversee and 
coordinate the plans of other levels and branches of government.” Notwithstanding that the impetus for such 
planning will originate democratically, this still implies government planning of the economy.
Next, the editors of Dissent (2015) cite Anne Phillips (1997) as an example of democratic socialism as 
well. But it is not clear what relation her essay bears to democratic socialism. Phillips argues that sexual 
disparities in income that are not due to any sexual difference in ability are illegitimate, just as racial disparities 
are. Phillips (1997: 34) argues that women are paid less than men, not primarily due to employer discrimination 
but rather because women's socially-expected domestic duties require them to work fewer hours for less pay. 
Phillips (1997: 37) proposes interventions such as mandatory paid parental leave, and she notes (1997: 38),
the kind of sexual equality I am describing might then turn out to be compatible with a capitalist 
economy. It is not compatible, however, with a hands-off noninterventionism that allows the 
immediate requirements of employers to dictate the hours and patterns of work. What I am 
describing here is probably more accurately described as social democracy than socialism.
There we have it: Phillips is not advocating democratic socialism at all. But perhaps we can learn what 
democratic socialism is by examining what it is not. The editors of Dissent (2015) have chosen to feature 
Phillips (1997) in a collection of articles about democratic socialism. Phillips (1997) has advocated a set of 
welfare-state interventions which she claims are characteristic of social democracy and not socialism. Therefore, 
we can conclude that democratic socialism does not mean welfare-state intervention nor is democratic socialism 
identical with social democracy. Hence, it seems safe to conclude that democratic socialism must entail planning.
Indeed, the next essay cited by Dissent (2015), Heilbroner (1978a), states (p. 341), “[b]eyond the welfare 
state lies the terra incognita we call socialism.” And again (ibid.), “Socialism, as most of us think about it, is not 
just an improved welfare state. It is another kind of society.” In his reply to Heilbroner, Bodgdan Denitch (1978: 
351) agrees, speaking of “a socialist society, the one presumably beyond the welfare state, the one in which 
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socialists are no longer just adding one more reform to a pyramid of welfare-state reforms.”According to 
Heilbroner (1978a: 342f.), the welfare-state is simply the means by which capitalism saves itself.14 Therefore 
(Heilbroner 1978a: 343), “the welfare state, adequate or not, must be considered as a form of capitalism” and 
socialism – including democratic socialism – must entail planning. As Heilbroner says (1978a: 343), socialism 
“must depend for its economic direction on some form of planning, and for its culture on some form of 
commitment to the idea of a morally conscious collectivity . . . the coordinating mechanism then becomes 
'command.'”15
At this point, we take a brief detour from Dissent (2015)'s reading list and examine the views of perhaps 
the most famous democratic socialist of all, George Orwell.16 As Orwell noted (1946: 1083f.), “Every line of 
serious work that I have written since 1936 has been written, directly or indirectly, against totalitarianism and 
for democratic Socialism, as I understand it” (emphasis in original). Orwell (1941a: 334) advocated the 
Nationalization of land, mines, railways, banks, and major industries. . . . The general tendency 
of this program aims quite frankly at turning . . . England into a Socialist democracy.”
In several places (Orwell 1941a: 317, 1941b: 1684, 1944: 232), Orwell warned that nationalization without 
egalitarian democracy would simply lead to “oligarchical collectivism” and caste rule. Richard White (2008:84) 
observes that Orwell (1941a) 
is at pains to point out that nationalization or ownership of the means of production achieves 
nothing if the workers remain subject to a ruling cadre who make all the important decisions in 
the name of “the State.”
Orwell (1935: 926) wrote that
Socialism used to be defined as “common ownership of the means of production,” but it is now 
seen that if common ownership means no more than centralized control, it merely paves the way 
for a new form of oligarchy. Centralized control is a necessary pre-condition of Socialism, but it 
no more produces Socialism than my typewriter would of itself produce this article I am writing.
Discussing the rise of totalitarianism, Orwell (1939: 111) states that, “The essential act is the rejection of 
democracy – that is, of the underlying values of democracy; once you have decided upon that, Stalin – or at any 
rate something like Stalin – is already on the way.” According to Orwell, then, a necessary condition for 
socialism is nationalization of the means of production and central planning, but this is not sufficient without 
democracy. Democratic socialism, according to Orwell, is just that: planning and nationalization in a democratic, 
egalitarian fashion.
Returning to Dissent (2015)'s list, the final essay, written by Michael Walzer (2010), stands on its own. 
Unlike all of the authors we have seen so far, Walzer (2010: 38) explicitly equates socialism with social 
democracy: “Today’s socialism—social democracy is probably the more accurate name. . .” He lists three 
essential traits of “today's socialism” (2010: 38): democracy, market regulation, and the welfare-state. Hence, 
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“the question 'Which socialism?' translates into 'What degree of democratic participation, market regulation, and 
welfare provision should we aim at?'” (Walzer 2010: 38). Walzer argues that the distinguishing characteristic of 
socialism is not a specific policy platform or political regime, but the means by which policies are pursued and 
the aims for which policies are sought: “What is most important, then, is not the final realization of socialist 
goals, but the process by which they are realized” (Walzer 2010: 39). He almost equates socialism with some 
sort of deliberative or majoritarian democracy, saying “Ours is a 'participatory' socialism” (Walzer 2010: 39). 
Socialism is the process of “socialism-in-the-making” by the common workers, on the grassroots level (Walzer 
2010: 41). Socialism-in-the-making “take[s] place in their unions, movements, parties, churches, and mutual aid 
organizations—in civil society, that is, and not in the state” (Walzer 2010: 42). Elsewhere (1978: 358), Walzer 
states that value attaches to the democratic process, not to its outcomes. So socialism simply means the outcome 
of authentically democratic action within civil society, regardless of what kind of policy platform or political 
regime this produces. One wonders: if the common people voted for laissez-faire capitalism, would socialism 
mean capitalism? At this point, the moniker “socialism” seems superfluous, for if socialism simply means 
democracy, then let us call it democracy. Walzer is not advocating democratic socialism, but simply plain 
democracy, period. Perhaps, with the fall of the Soviet Union and the evident failure of actually existent 
socialism, Walzer has simply run out of ideas. As Heilbroner has noted elsewhere (1989: 109),
The collapse of centralized planning shows that at this moment socialism has no plausible 
economic framework, but the word has always meant more than a system of economic 
organization. At its core, it has stood for a commitment to social goals that have seemed 
incompatible with, or at least unattainable under, capitalism-above all, the moral, not just the 
material, elevation of humankind.”
Be this as it may; we still need an operational definition of democratic socialism. We have seen that all 
of the rest of the authors besides Walzer equate democratic socialism either with planning or else with 
syndicalism. And as we have dismissed syndicalism as merely a form of capitalism, we shall assume, for the 
remainder of this essay, that democratic socialism entails government economic planning. Thus, democratic 
socialism is the system wherein the entire economy – meaning, as we shall see, every material aspect of life – is 
subject to political decision-making by a democratic government. According to Mises (1981 [1922]: 399), it is 
the theory that “The People must take the administration of economic matters into their own hands, just as they 
have taken over the government of the state.” Or in Lavoie's (1985a: 126) words, “The basic message of this 
movement is that a 'democratic' form of planning ought to be advocated as the only feasible alternative to 
fascism or corporate planning.” In fact, this definition – of democratic socialism as implying democratic 
planning – squares nicely with Walzer's definition of socialism as pure democratic political action: democratic 
socialism is the political system in which there is no limitation on democracy – when every material aspect of 
life, without exception, is subject to democratic decision. The sphere of democratic governance is simply 
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expanded to encompass the entire economy. In Lavoie's (1985a: 127) words, “The central idea associated with 
the phrase 'economic democracy' is the pleasant-sounding notion that democracy, which has heretofore been 
restricted to the political sphere, should be extended into the economic sphere.” The two notions of democratic 
planning and pure democracy come to mean essentially the same thing: all of human existence is to be 
democratically socialized.
II. ANDREI SHLEIFER'S AND ROBERT W. VISHNY'S “THE POLITICS OF MARKET SOCIALISM” 
(1994)
Now we review Shleifer's and Vishny's (1994) argument against market socialism which is, as we 
mentioned, different from Hayek's and Jewkes's criticism of democratic socialism. Both Hayek-Jewkes and 
Shleifer-Vishny undertake Public Choice criticisms of freer forms of socialism, but in different ways.
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1994: 165f.), “Under all forms of market socialism ... politicians' 
objectives must determine resource allocation. Market socialists have traditionally assumed that politicians will 
assume an efficient resource allocation.” Advocates of democratic or market socialism “all presume efficiency-
maximizing politicians” (Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 167) and when they prescribe what a good government 
ought to do, they “presume that it actually wants to do so” (Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 167). Their criticism is 
essentially an application of the familiar and accepted conclusions of Public Choice (Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 
168) and it basically predicts a failure of political institutions to create appropriate incentives or to prevent the 
abuse of power. Shleifer and Vishny use the economic theory of rational, utility-maximizing individuals to cast 
doubt on the general willingness of politicians – who are human – to implement market socialism the way it is 
supposed to be. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994: 166) claim that Oskar Lange's proposal for market socialism successfully 
refuted Ludwig von Mises's argument that economic calculation is impossible under socialism. Therefore, 
Shleifer and Vishny criticize only the political feasibility of market socialism, not its theoretical economic 
validity. They would appear to agree with Robert L. Heilbroner's (2008) statement about Soviet-style central 
planning, that “[t]he crucial missing element is not so much 'information,' as Mises and Hayek argued, as it is the 
motivation to act on information.”
In addition, Shleifer and Vishny have a second argument against market socialism: that it is vulnerable to 
rent-seeking, creating economic inefficiencies (Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 171f.).17 They concede that the same 
problem exists under democratic capitalism, but they claim that the inefficiencies would be worse under market 
socialism (Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 172-174).18 Hence, the criticism by Shleifer and Vishny of market 
socialism is a simple – though nonetheless valuable – application of straightforward, textbook Public Choice: the 
political officials will have insufficient incentive to implement market socialism according to the specified rules, 
and rent-seeking inefficiencies will undermine the rules of the system.19
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It is worth highlighting that even though Shleifer and Vishny are targeting market socialism for their 
criticism, all of these problems they point out would be even worse under democratic socialism. For as we have 
noted, market socialism does attempt to impose highly limiting restraints on the behavior of public officials. 
According to market socialism, officials are to obey strict Neoclassical economic rules of cost accounting, and 
they are to have as little discretion as possible. While in fact, the implementation of market socialism would 
require public officials to exercise more discretion and entrepreneurial speculation than its advocates thought 
(Hayek 1948: 197-199), the fact remains that market socialism – in principle, at least – attempts to rigorously 
constrain public officials. Even so, Shleifer and Vishny demonstrate, it would be plagued by Public Choice 
problems. But what, then, of democratic socialism? Democratic socialism does not even attempt to constrain the 
government by anything except the will of the people. But the people can will literally anything. There is no 
strict cost-accounting which the government must obey, nor are there any other strict rules which are imposed to 
unconditionally constrain the government. Therefore, Public Choice problems would be even more pervasive 
under democratic socialism than under market socialism, and everything said by Shleifer and Vishny against 
market socialism would apply perhaps doubly or triply to democratic socialism.
III. THE CONTRIBUTION OF HAYEK AND JEWKES
1. The Relative Neglect of Hayek and Jewkes
But Shleifer and Vishny (1994: 170) explicitly state that while they are sympathetic to Hayek's 
arguments, they will not adopt them. One reason is that Hayek's work “made a relatively bigger impression on 
public opinion than on the economics profession” (Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 168). This is only more reason to 
reexamine Hayek's arguments and offer them a fuller hearing. 
Nor do Shleifer and Vishny explain in any detail what Hayek's arguments were. According to their 
laconic summary, Hayek “argued that democracy is impossible in a country where a single leader has all the 
power that comes with controlling capital” (Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 170). While this is not inaccurate, it is 
extremely over-simplified. Hayek's argument was much more detailed than this and it deserves further attention. 
Lawson and Clark (2010: 231) state that Hayek's theory was “[not] particularly detailed,” and they can find only 
three specific arguments he made: first, that power corrupts; second, that planners must subject voters to 
propaganda and political controls in order to dupe voters into supporting the code of values guiding and 
underlying the planners' plan; and third, that if voters' preferences are not stable, then for the plan to maintain 
stability and consistency, it must be administered non-democratically. Lawson and Clark note that these latter 
two explanations are inconsistent: according to one, voters are tricked into democratically supporting the plan, 
and according to the other, the plan is insulated from democracy, kept out of the voters' hands so that their 
support is not even necessary. But Hayek's arguments are far more detailed than this and less inconsistent with 
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each other than Lawson and Clark (2010) suggest. Some of Hayek's arguments were even sophisticated enough 
to resemble Arrow's Impossibility Theorem (Boettke and Leeson 2002, Boettke 1995: 19f.). The fundamental 
point – according to this feature of Hayek's argument – is that no single consistent, coherent plan can be arrived 
at by democratic means. The needs to dupe voters and/or to keep the plan out of their hands are simply 
corollaries of that Arrow paradox. If this is true, then Hayek's argument was more sophisticated than many have 
realized, and it deserves more attention.
Finally, Shleifer and Vishny – as well as Lawson and Clark – completely neglect the parallel contribution 
of John Jewkes. The arguments of Hayek and Jewkes against democratic socialism are intimately related even 
though Hayek's work is far more well-known than Jewkes's.20 In the Road to Serfdom, Hayek (2007 [1944]) cites 
an earlier edition of Jewkes's The New Ordeal by Planning (1968 [1948]), saying “[i]t is the best discussion 
known to me of a concrete instance of the phenomenon discussed in general terms in this book” (Hayek 2007 
[1944]: 51). Meanwhile, for his part, Jewkes described Hayek's Road to Serfdom (2007 [1944]) as “masterly” 
(Jewkes 1968: xiii) for its “analysis which has never been confuted” (Jewkes 1968: 182 note). Therefore, 
Jewkes's criticism of democratic socialism deserves notice, if for no other reason than the pursuit of intellectual 
history.21 
2. The Hayek-Jewkes Argument in Brief
Hayek and Jewkes argue that the problem with democratic socialism is not that the government officials' 
priorities will be wrong or that they will use their power with malicious intent. Their argument is not primarily 
that power corrupts. In contrast to Shleifer and Vishny, they argue that even a perfectly well-intentioned, 
benevolent, and altruistic government will nevertheless fail to accomplish the purposes of socialism because the 
political institutions of democracy are fundamentally incompatible with the economic goals of socialism. 
Therefore, Hayek and Jewkes sidestep some of the more traditional concerns of Public Choice – which are so 
effectively voiced by Shleifer and Vishny (1994) – and they instead point out completely different political-
institutional problems with democratic socialism. Thus, both Hayek and Jewkes on the one hand and Shleifer 
and Vishny on the other make economic criticisms of political institutions – in other words, they pursue the 
analysis of Public Choice – but they do so in quite different ways.
Peter Boettke (1995) has already demonstrated several Public Choice features of Hayek's (2007 [1944]) 
argument in the Road to Serfdom, so we shall briefly recapitulate his statements: several scholars argue that 
Hayek completely ignored Public Choice (Boettke 1995: 7). But Boettke (1995: 8) replies “the book set out to 
explicate how socialist ideas change the demands on democratic institutions and how these institutions are in 
turn transformed into instruments of totalitarian rule because of their inability to meet these changing demands 
in a manner consistent with democratic principles.” Hayek's contribution was the application of specifically 
Austrian economic theory to decision-making within non-market settings (Boettke 1995: 19). Such a project 
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clearly falls within the scope of Public Choice.22
Hayek first argued that the socialist rejection of competition would unintentionally empower interest 
groups and encourage special pleading for protection (Boettke 1995: 10).23 Thus, Hayek understood one of the 
central claims of modern Public Choice, the logic of concentrated benefits and dispersed costs (Boettke 1995: 
10). Furthermore, Hayek's defense of the rule of law – that laws should be abstract and generally applicable to all 
– may be understood as a call for a legal rule which eliminates opportunities for interest groups to obtain special 
exemptions and concessions by special pleading (Boettke 1995: 10). Note that in Boettke's reading, Hayek's 
argument is very similar to Shleifer and Vishny's concerning rent-seeking.
Second, Hayek said, economic freedom and political freedom cannot be distinguished because there is 
no separate economic sector of life. Economics is the science concerning human action which chooses means in 
order to accomplish ends. Thus, economics concerns all areas of life, and economic liberties cannot be 
disentangled from any other aspect of life (Boettke 1995: 11).
Third, Boettke says (1995: 11f.), Hayek examined the institutional incentives facing those holding 
political power under socialism. Just as market production is guided by comparative advantage, so is political 
production. Under both market and political systems, production proceeds according to opportunity cost. But a 
political system will tend to reward those who are less than morally scrupulous about the use and abuse of 
political power. Socialism fails, not because a few “bad men” accidentally find themselves in power. On the 
contrary, it is the institutional incentives of a socialist political regime answer which explain “why the worst get 
on top” (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 157-170). The system of discretionary planning requires the use of authority, and 
this incentivizes those most willing to use authority with the fewest scruples. Notice here too that in Boettke's 
reading, Hayek's argument resembles that of Shleifer and Vishny and basic Public Choice.
Fourth, Hayek anticipated Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, which “could be reinterpreted as an 
application of Mises's impossibility thesis to non-market decision making via democratic voting” (Boettke 1995: 
19). Just as Mises argued that a socialist planner could not economically calculate, a democratic socialist polity – 
said Hayek – could not “calculate” the will of the people. As is well known, the only solution to Arrow-type 
voting paradoxes is dictatorship. This underlies Hayek's criticism elsewhere of the political provision of public 
goods: what are the demand-revealing processes when goods are politically provided? (Boettke 1995: 20). 
Hayek did not ideologically assume market failures away, but he recognized that like the market process, the 
political process is imperfect as well – except that the political process does not engender the same incentives 
nor information as markets do to promote error detection and correction (Boettke 1995: 20). Unfortunately, at the 
time, “a naïve view of democratic governance dominated discourse . . . [t]he voting process unambiguously 
conveyed the necessary information” (Boettke 1995: 15), and critics could not understand Hayek's point 
(Boettke 1995: 13-18).
In summary, Boettke (1995) finds that Hayek anticipated at least three basic teachings of Public Choice: 
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the logic of collective action which enables special interests to obtain privileges, the fact that political behavior 
is conditioned by the institutional constraints and incentives of the office, and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. 
The fourth feature which Boettke finds in Hayek, the impossibility of distinguishing between political and 
economic freedom, is crucial although it is not clear whether this should be considered an aspect of Public 
Choice or not. The remainder of this essay will expand on these features of Hayek's thought and discuss several 
more as well, and relate them all to the specific case of democratic socialism. In addition, we will show how 
John Jewkes joined Hayek in these arguments.
3. The Coercive, Illiberal Nature of Planning: Hayek and Jewkes on the Allocation of Labor under Socialism
The first problem with planning and socialism which we will discuss, is that all planning is necessarily 
coercive; it is impossible to plan the economy without planning individual people's lives. Planning necessarily 
requires making people's life decisions for them. As Hayek notes, many of the planners have failed to realize this 
fact. “The consolation our planners offer us is that this authoritarian direction will apply 'only' to economic 
matters” (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 124). But Hayek responds that this reply is based on “the erroneous belief that 
there are purely economic ends separate from the other ends of life” (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 125; cf. Boettke 1995: 
11). Economics is simply the science of choosing those means which are most satisfactory for accomplishing 
given ends. In this sense, every aspect of life is economic in nature (Mises 1981 [1922]: 107) . As physical 
beings, humans cannot accomplish any ends without the use of material means. For example, it is impossible to 
learn and obtain knowledge without access to physical books or physical classrooms. If the government is to 
plan the production of books and classrooms, then it must plan the terms and conditions on which people will be 
able to obtain knowledge. In response to Marx's statement that “in place of the government over persons comes 
the administration of things,” Mises (1981 [1922]: 73) replies, “there can be no administration of goods which is 
not administration of men – i.e. the bending of one human will to another – and no direction of productive 
processes which is not the government over persons – i.e. domination of one human will by another.” Therefore, 
Hayek states, economic planning raises the question of “whether it shall be we who decide what is more, and 
what is less, important for us, or whether this is to be decided by the planners” (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 126). “The 
authority directing all economic activity . . . would control the allocation of the limited means for all our ends” 
(Hayek 2007 [1944]: 126). “Economic control is not merely control of a sector of human life which can be 
separated from the rest; it is the control of the means for all our ends” (Hayek 2007 [1944]:127). 
But we do not wish to belabor this point too much in the abstract. Let us illustrate this principle with a 
concrete example: planning, consistently pursued, demands the coercive regimentation of labor; planning 
precludes freedom of one's occupation and even the place where one lives. As Hayek (2007 [1944]: 129) states, 
“If they want to plan, they must control the entry into the different trades and occupations.” This illiberal 
implication follows, according to both Hayek and Jewkes, from the great difficulty of economically allocating 
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labor efficiently absent the price-system. In a market economy, labor is allocated through differential wages. 
Wages rise or fall to equilibrate supply and demand for labor. Every form of labor has some market-clearing 
wage whose rate produces a stable equilibrium. But under socialism, where wages are either equal or 
approximately equal, differential wage rates are unable to perform this allocational function. Barring income 
inequality, the only conceivable solution is some sort of labor-rationing system, whereby the political system 
dictates by fiat who is to be employed where. But a system of compulsory, involuntary employment is hardly 
compatible with the aspirations of democratic socialism.24 As Hayek wrote (1984b [1976]: 126),
In a society whose wealth rests on prompt adaptation to constantly changing circumstances,, the 
individual can be left free to choose the directions of his efforts only if rewards fluctuate with 
the value of the services he can contribute to the society's common pool of resources. If his 
income is politically determined, he loses not merely the incentive but also the possibility of 
deciding what he ought to do in the general interest. And if he cannot know himself what he 
must do to make his services valuable to his fellows, he must be commanded to do what is 
required. 
Similarly, according to John Jewkes (1968)'s New Ordeal by Planning, “whatever the original intentions 
of the planners, compulsion of labour soon becomes inevitable. For how, otherwise can labour be got into the 
appropriate jobs?” (Jewkes 1968: 90). And further (Jewkes 1968: 191),
Labour is one of the resources which must be forced to fit into the [central economic planning] 
scheme as a whole. . . . [D]irection of labour is inevitably bound up with a plan courageously 
followed to its logical conclusion. . . . So long as the aim is a planned economy there can be no 
doubt of the trend of social pressures: it will be towards a progressive restriction in the choice of 
occupation.25
And this was not mere idle and unrealistic theorizing by Jewkes, for (Jewkes 1968: 191, 193):
the British planners, against all their best instincts, were driven to the restoration of conscription 
of labour in 1947. . . . By the autumn of that year it was the law of land that (with the exception 
of a small proportion of the working population) no man between the ages of 18 and 50 years 
and no woman between the ages of 18 and 40 years could change his or her occupation at will. 
Central economic planning in Great Britain – had it been pursued consistently – would have required 
conscription and regimentation of all labor - corvée and serfdom . Indeed, the government did not shy away from 
this logical consequence for long. In 1947, the British Labour government renewed its wartime requisitioning 
powers by enacting the Control of Engagements Order which empowered the government to conscript labor for 
essential industries. As Hayek noted, merely “six months later [after the war] the same government found itself 
in peacetime forced to put the conscription of labor back on the statute book” (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 47).26 
Jewkes argued that this involuntary servitude was not a consequence of any despotic intent or moral 
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depravity or abuse of power, but was dictated “by the logic of events” (Jewkes 1968: 193) and by “the 
inexorable demands of the plan” (ibid.). Likewise, according to Hayek, “[t]here is no better illustration [than this 
regimentation of labor] of the manner in which the inherent logic of their policies drove an unwilling socialist 
government into the kind of coercion it disliked” (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 47). In contrast to Shleifer and Vishny, the 
problem here with democratic socialism is not that the politicians will abuse their power or be insufficiently 
benevolent or lack proper incentives. No matter how benevolent the political officials are, and no matter how 
proper their incentives are, any thoroughgoing and successfully-implemented democratic socialism, say Hayek 
and Jewkes, must be totalitarian and authoritarian. If anything, the more sincere and disinterested the politicians 
are, the more thoroughly they will strive to implement the socialist plan without any regard for their own self-
interest, and the more likely they will turn to regimentation of labor. It should not be surprising, therefore, that 
François-Noël (Gracchus) Babeuf, in his communistic scheme for France – sincerely intended to fulfill the 
democratic and libertarian aims of the French Revolution – proposed “to displace workers in accordance with 
national needs” (Talmon 1960: 239).27
Astoundingly, none other than George Orwell himself seems to have lately realized this logical 
consequence. In Orwell's final edition of “London Letters” in the Partisan Review (11:3, summer 1946), Orwell 
argued (to quote Newsinger 1999: 139)
that in conditions of full employment if wages are evened out, workers will drift away from the 
more disagreeable jobs . . . Quite incredibly, he [Orwell] argued that socialists had to face up to 
the fact that “you had to make use of forced labour for the dirtier kinds of work.”
Not long before, in July 1945, Orwell had similarly stated in the Partisan Review that Britain “will be obliged to 
both coerce the miners” and that “post-war reconstruction . . . [would require] 'direction' of labour over a long 
period” (quoted in Farrant 2015: 176n43).28 It is difficult to determine how democracy could successfully 
prevent socialism from turning tyrannical, if any form of egalitarian socialism necessarily requires compulsory 
labor. If central economic planning cannot work without conscription of labor, then democratic socialism 
amounts to letting the slave elect his slave-master without the freedom to leave the plantation. If any economic 
plan is necessarily authoritarian and totalitarian by its very nature and essence, then democracy will do little to 
help.
Years after he wrote the Road to Serfdom (Hayek 2007 [1944]), Hayek stated that his argument in that 
book applied not only to central planning but also to the modern welfare state (Hayek 1984b [1976]: 119; cf. 
Farrant and McPhail (2009: 12, 15) contra Caldwell in Hayek 2007 [1944]: 30f.). Hayek's justification for this 
statement was his assertion that the welfare state, pursuing “social justice,” must rely on price-controls to fix the 
remuneration of labor, in order to ensure that every form of labor receives its “fair” due (Hayek 1984b [1976]: 
120). It may be objected that in fact, no welfare state today fixes the prices of labor. But this does not refute 
Hayek's argument that if were welfare states were to fix wages then we would wind up traveling along the road 
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to serfdom. The fact that welfare states today have wisely eschewed totalitarian controls is does not refute 
Hayek's prediction of what their effects would be. 
Furthermore, notice that taxation of incomes is a form of price-control on labor. If the natural market rate 
for a given type of labor is $100,000, then there is no difference between taxing that labor to the amount of 
$30,000 versus fixing that labor at $70,000 and leaving it un-taxed. The reason why progressive income taxes do 
not produce totalitarian outcomes, however, is that the governments of all welfare states today do not attempt to 
ensure that any particular kind of labor is done with any particular frequency or with any particular productive 
output. In other words, contemporary governments are content to manipulate the returns to different kinds of 
labor and then allow the market to decide how many people will occupy themselves in those various labors and 
how much output they will produce. In other words, governments have manipulated prices but they tolerate the 
market consequences of those manipulations. In other words, welfare states have eschewed any attempts to plan. 
That is why there are no evidently totalitarian consequences. But suppose the governments were to tax a given 
kind of labor and simultaneously insist that the employment and output in the taxed industry be precisely the 
same as it was before the tax was implemented. Similarly, suppose these governments were to tax a given kind 
of labor and also demand that employment and output in the corresponding industry satisfy some arbitrarily-
determined figure (say, that there must be such-and-such a number of coal miners and such-and-such an output 
of coal). In other words, suppose that “fair” wage controls were imposed to ensure “social justice” at the same 
time that economic planning were attempted. This could not be accomplished without compulsion and forcible 
assignment of employment against the wills of those employed. No government may fix a tax upon a particular 
kind of labor nor fix its wage-rate and simultaneously fix a level of employment and output in the corresponding 
industry, without resort to corvée.
Strictly speaking, then government ownership or regulation of the means of production does not require 
equality of wages. Precisely because Lange envisioned differential wages and income inequality under market 
socialism, Lange (1938: 83) could state“[f]reedom of choice of occupation [is] assumed” under socialism and 
(Lange 1938: 72) that we can “assume that freedom of choice in consumption and freedom of choice of 
occupation are maintained” by socialism. Since Harrington (1978a: 443f.) and Schweickart (1992: 11) both 
approvingly cite Lange, it might be assumed that their schemes both presuppose freedom of choice of occupation 
as well. But in fact, if we read the entire relevant passage in Lange (1938: 83f.), we can readily see that this 
assumption would be false, precisely because Lange presupposed  radical income inequality. Discussing the 
distribution of profits and interest to the citizens in the form of a social dividend, Lange (1938: 83f.) states,
Freedom of choice of occupation assumed, the distribution of the social dividend may affect the 
amount of services of labor offered to different industries. If certain occupations received a 
larger social dividend than others, labor would be diverted into the occupations receiving a 
larger dividend. Therefore, the distribution of the social dividend must be such as not to interfere 
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with the optimum distribution of labor services between the different industries and occupations. 
. . . Therefore, the social dividend must be distributed so as to have no influence whatsoever on 
the choice of occupation. The social dividend paid to an individual must be entirely independent 
of his choice of occupation.
Although Lange is discussing the distribution of firm dividends, not wages, his statement implicitly agrees with 
Hayek and Jewkes that the wage or income in any given industry determines how many people will choose to be 
employed in that industry. The government cannot arbitrarily determine incomes according to egalitarian 
standards of “fairness” and still obtain a predetermined pattern of production and employment. Freedom of 
choice of occupation requires that the government abstain from interfering with inequality of income. Assuming 
that the desired pattern of production is sacrosanct, the social dividend cannot be distributed in such a way as to 
reduce inequality because this would influence the choice of occupation. Wages and incomes must be permitted 
to be unequal from one industry to another. If a specific pattern of production is aimed for, then the government 
must allow wages to freely vary in order to attract precisely the right amount and kinds of labor to each industry. 
Contrariwise, if the government settles upon a policy of income equality, then it cannot aim for any particular 
pattern of productive output or distribution of labor across industries. This is the course which modern welfare 
states have taken: they have chosen to relatively equalize wages but permit production and employment to vary 
themselves, not according to any plan.
But it is hard to imagine why any socialist intent on planning, would desire government ownership of the 
means of production if inequality remained basically the same as it was under free-market capitalism. As Hayek 
(1984b [1976]: 123) says in response to Lange, a regime implementing market socialism
could do nothing to secure that the remuneration the the market gave to each participant would 
correspond to what the government regarded as socially just. Yet to achieve such a so-called 
'just' remuneration was, after all, the whole intended purpose of the socialist revolution!
Let us not forget that the incomes of business executives and managers and the allocation of their labor are all 
regulated by the same economic principles as the incomes and allocation of all other kinds of labor. Managerial 
and executive labor must be allocated as well, and there seems to be no reason why the market-clearing rate for 
their labor ought to be different under socialism than under capitalism. So according to Lange's market 
socialism, roughly the same inequality must prevail under socialism as under capitalism. This clearly will not 
satisfy many socialists, who will insist on a more thoroughly implemented scheme of (approximate) equality of 
income. The recent reception of Thomas Piketty (2014 [2013])'s Capital in the Twenty-First Century should 
make it clear that Lange's endorsement of radical income inequality will not tend to be shared by many 
socialists.
It is also important to note that Lange's statement that “The social dividend paid to an individual must be 
entirely independent of his choice of occupation” is not entirely accurate. This implies that a per-capita 
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egalitarian distribution of the social dividend – an exactly equal number of dollars per person – would be 
sufficient to avoid affecting labor incentives. But this is not true because incentives and values are always 
marginal. A $100 dividend given to someone who earns $100,000 is not the same as a $100 dividend given to 
someone who earns only $50,000. Value is marginal, meaning the value of an objectively constant thing will 
subjectively vary, depending on what it is being compared to. Whether a person chooses to take one job at one 
wage or another job at another wage will depend on the size of the social dividend. Suppose a person is earning 
$50,000 and they know that they can earn twice as much money by working twice as hard. They may find this 
worthwhile. But suppose the social dividend is $20,000 per year, independent of a person's occupation. Then the 
choice is not $50,000 versus $100,000, but instead, it is $70,000 versus $120,000. And now the person may not 
regard it worthwhile to work twice as hard to earn $120,000 instead of $70,000. The income and substitution 
effects of labor versus leisure are complex, and here is not the place to review Slutsky-Hicks compensated 
demand curves. But the point is that because value is marginal, an egalitarian distribution of the social dividend 
will affect incentives for labor. The social dividend must be distributed unequally in such a way that incentives 
will be the same as if it were never distributed at all. It is difficult – probably impossible – to know how to 
properly distribute the social dividend unequally in such a way as to leave incentives unaffected. The challenge 
of determining how to properly distribute the social dividend creates an entirely new problem which Lange's 
market socialism never addressed. Alternatively, Lange could specify an egalitarian distribution of the social 
dividend and then allow wages to vary until the combination of unequal wages plus egalitarian social dividend 
produced an equilibrium pattern of employment. The final income package combining unequal wages with equal 
social dividend would still have to be sufficiently non-egalitarian to produce the desired planned pattern of 
productive output. To the extent that the egalitarian social dividend reduced inequality, wages would have to 
become even more unequal than before so that the final income package of wages plus dividend produced 
precisely the right amount of inequality to incentive the desired pattern of productive output. It is impossible to 
promote income equality under socialism while simultaneously seeking to achieve a given planned pattern of 
production and output. 
Harrington (1978a: 443f.) approvingly cites Lange (1938) and yet he also declares (1978a: 445) that 
“The wage structure, then, would be infinitely more progressive than it is within capitalism.” He does not seem 
to understand – as Lange did – that a progressive wage structure is inconsistent with a targeted pattern of 
consumption, production, and employment. Harrington (1978a: 446) states that “differentials related to skill and 
output . . . would be tolerated, precisely as an incentive for individuals and enterprises to produce more 
efficiently,” but he is not aware that these differentials may have to be quite as large as they already are under 
capitalism. He advocates (Harrington 1978a: 446) “an egalitarian tax policy [that] would severely limit the 
differentials and' work toward a redistribution of income and wealth,” but he fails to understand that an 
egalitarian tax policy would completely negate the wage differentials he had advocated just a moment earlier. It 
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makes no sense to provide wage surpluses as rewards and then to turn right around and tax them away again. 
Then Harrington (1978a: 446) says “a part of the wage would be received collectively, as a social dividend from 
heightened productivity,” but this would entail precisely the same problems as it does for Lange, which we have 
shown. In the end, Harrington cannot have his cake and eat it too; he cannot have differential wages and 
egalitarian redistribution and a targeted pattern of consumption, production, and employment. One cannot dictate 
both prices and economic outcomes without resort to direct physical coercion. If the government fixes wages 
and taxes so as to achieve economic equality, then it cannot target a specifically patterned economic outcome. If 
the government seeks to achieve both equality and this predetermined productive output, this is possible only 
through the use of corvée and compulsory direction of employment.
In summary: for a socialist government to be authentically socialist – for it to consistently and 
completely plan the economy and maintain equality of wages – it must assign everyone to his occupation 
without any freedom of employment. Otherwise, the government cannot by its own power ensure the plan will 
be implemented. Either a democratic socialist government will insist on this assignment procedure and become 
tyrannical, or else it will abandon the assignment procedure and permit freedom of employment, preserving 
democratic values at the cost of abandoning socialism. A compromise is possible, but because socialism and 
individual autonomy are at opposite poles and inversely proportional, the one must be sacrificed to the identical 
degree to which the other is not. It is no great consolation to the socialist to be told that any compromise between 
socialism and freedom is an exactly proportioned one, with exactly as much socialism as there is not freedom, 
and vice versa. One solution is, of course, to allow income inequality so that labor is allocated by wage 
differentials, but this would defeat the egalitarian aims of socialism.
It will be seen that this phenomenon is – as we intimated at the beginning of this section – really but a 
specific example of the more general impossibility of separating political from economic freedom (Lawson and 
Clark 2010; Boettke 1995: 10f.; Rothbard 1977: 25).29 As Milton Friedman notes (1962: 7), “the advocacy of 
'democratic socialism' [rests on the belief that] . . . politics and economics are separate and largely 
unconnected . . . and that any kind of political arrangements can be combined with any kind of economic 
arrangements.” For example, Friedman points out (1962: 16-18), the freedom of speech is difficult to maintain 
when the government owns all the printing presses and meeting houses (cf. Rothbard 1977: 26). Even were the 
government to decide to subsidize subversive dissent – as Michael Harrington advocates (1978a: 443, 1978b: 
357; cf. Lavoie 1985a: 139) – the government would have to decide whose dissent was legitimate and worthy of 
subsidy. The government could not subsidize all dissent for then countless individuals would choose to become 
professional dissenters, and the quantity of dissent supplied would approach infinity (Friedman 1962: 18). But if 
the government can only afford to subsidize some dissent and not others, and if there no private source of credit 
or funding for dissenters, then the democratic socialist government has an absolute power over deciding whose 
dissent will be given a platform. When we admit the democratic socialist government is to have the power to 
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decide whose dissent is legitimate, then we end up with the very same problem of totalitarianism which 
democratic socialism was meant to avoid in the first place.30
But we have chosen to emphasize the involuntary nature of labor under socialism in particular, rather 
than the more general impossibility of individual freedom under socialism, however because with the former, the 
problem is so much more stark. There should be an immediacy to the problem of labor which even the problem 
of speech might not possess: if socialism requires regimenting labor, what hope for any other kind of freedom 
can there be? Slavery is the paradigmatic denial of individual freedom, and yet it is precisely slavery – or some 
degree of slavery – in the most literal sense of compelled labor, which socialism requires for its effective 
operation. Most citizens do not publish newspaper editorials very often, so the denial of the freedom of speech 
may not mean much for them, but there is no citizen who is not terrified by the prospect of slavery. 
Even the English socialist Maurice Dobb realized this dilemma and despaired of the possibility of 
maintaining freedom under socialism, saying, “Either planning means overriding the autonomy of separate 
decisions, or it apparently means nothing at all” (quoted in Trygve J. B. Hoff 1981: 267; cf. Hayek 1948: 158). 
Similarly, the socialist H. D. Dickinson remarked that “even if a socialist planner wished to realize freedom he 
could not do so and remain a planner” (quoted in Hayek 1948: 206). This fact – that socialism depends on 
command – is related to Hayek's argument that the rule-of-law could not be maintained under socialism (Hayek 
(2007 [1944]: 112-123). According to Hayek, the rule-of-law entails that everyone is governed by general rules 
which apply equally to everyone and which do not single anybody out. People should be treated impartially and 
the laws should provide a general framework within which people can plan their own lives. But planning by 
command necessarily requires singling some kinds of people or some kinds of activities to be treated radically 
different than others. People's lives must be planned for them, and the government's plans may radically change 
from one moment to the next according to expediency. A construction worker might suddenly be ordered to 
become a coal miner if the government decides it needs more coal than it previously expected.
Robert Heilbroner was most explicit of all concerning socialism's reliance on command. According to 
him (1978a: 345),
If tradition cannot, and the market system should not, underpin the socialist order, we are left 
with some form of command as the necessary means for securing its continuance and 
adaptation. Indeed, that is what planning means. Command by planning need not, of course, be 
totalitarian. But an aspect of authoritarianism resides inextricably in all planning systems.31 A 
plan is meaningless if it is not carried out, or if it can be ignored or defied at will. Some form of 
penalty must assure the necessary degree of compliance. Compliance need not be total, and 
penalties need not be Draconian. Incentives may succeed where punishments fail. But planning 
will not assure a socialist society of a capacity to endure or adapt unless the planning is a system 
of effective command. From that conclusion I see no escape.
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Heilbroner concludes (1978a: 348) that, “What is important, in trying to think about socialism, is to resist the 
delusion that history is so soft and indeterminate that we can have a socialist cake with bourgeois icing.” For this 
reason, Heilbroner said (1978a: 347), “The rights of individuals to their Millian liberties . . . [are] directly 
opposed to the basic social commitment to a deliberately embraced collective moral goal.” Heilbroner would 
later add (1986: 126) that “democratic liberties have not yet appeared, except fleetingly, in any nation that has 
declared itself to be fundamentally anticapitalist.”32
4. Democracy as a Means vs. an End, or: Liberal vs. Illiberal Democracy
There is another reason why democratic socialism must inevitably fail to avert the totalitarian potential 
of socialism. This is based on the understanding that democracy is but a means to an end. As economists 
emphasize, some means are more appropriate than others to achieve given ends, and some means are completely 
inappropriate for certain ends. According to Hayek, this is true of democracy as well:
Democracy is essentially a means, a utilitarian device for safeguarding internal peace and 
individual freedom. As such it is by no means infallible or certain. . . . [There is] the misleading 
and unfounded belief that, so long as the ultimate source of power is the will of the majority, the 
power cannot be arbitrary. . . . If democracy resolves on a task which necessarily involves the 
use of power which cannot be guided by fixed rules, it must become an arbitrary power. (Hayek 
2007 [1944]: 110f.)33
According to Hayek, in other words, democracy is but a means to the end of limiting power.34 Some of the 
advocates of democratic socialism share this conception. For example Lavoie (1985a: 137) quotes Alperovitz 
and Faux's statement that we need to develop “new democratic arrangements to avoid the dangers of centralized 
bureaucratic power” and John Buell's argument that “without it [democracy], that planning that is surely coming 
in one form or another carry a heavy measure of repression.” These advocates of democracy socialism agree 
with Hayek that a critical function of democracy is the limitation of the exercise of government power.
But if the government's policy is one which necessarily relies on absolute political power to be 
implemented, then either democracy must be sacrificed to the policy, or the policy must be sacrificed to 
democracy. One cannot combine a policy of limiting government power via democracy on the one hand, with a 
socialist policy which necessarily requires unlimited government power to be implemented. One – democratic 
limitation or socialist absolutism – must be subordinated to the other. Even if democracy were somehow 
maintained under socialism it would still not accomplish its purpose, for the purpose of democracy is to limit 
power but a socialist government would necessarily be unlimited. An authentically socialist democratic regime 
socialism would at best be a tyrannical despotism which somehow succeeded in maintaining the outward 
trappings of democracy without maintaining anything of the spirit or intention of democracy. Once again, it 
would be something akin to giving a slave the power to elect his slave-master without giving him the freedom to 
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escape the plantation.
One might reply that in fact, democracy is not merely a means to an end; democracy is not merely a 
method by which to limit political power. Instead, democracy might be conceived as an end unto itself. Coser 
and Howe (1954: 132) are right to argue that
the distinction made in English political theory, but neglected by Marxists, between democracy 
as an expression of popular sovereignity [sic] and democracy as a pattern of government in 
which the rights of minority groups are especially defended, needs to be taken seriously.
Michael Walzer comes close to the conception of democracy as an expression of popular sovereignty rather than 
as a means of protecting minorities, arguing that value inheres not in the socialist outcomes but in the democratic 
process itself (Walzer 2010, 1978: 358). This means that for Walzer, democracy is not a means but an end. 
Several other advocates of democratic socialism seem to agree, saying for example that “the democratic process 
means allowing people to make direct input into decisions that affect their lives” (Lavoie 1985a: 127 quoting 
Tom Hayden) and that we need “active popular participation in the day-to-day running of the basic institutions of 
the economy and the society” (Lavoie 1985a: 127 quoting Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison). In this 
conception, democracy is not merely a means for obtaining the good – such as by restraining governmental 
abuse of power to protect minorities – but rather, democracy is itself fundamentally constitutive of the good. The 
good is good because it is democratic. It is not the outcomes or benefits of democracy which are good, but 
democracy is itself good regardless of its consequences.35
But when the good is defined as the democratic consensus, there is no room left for any constitutional 
restraints on the exercise of democratic power. This may quickly produce an illiberal democracy where there are 
no constitutional limits on power (Percy 1955: 61, Röpke 1998 [1957]: 66, 68). Individual rights and freedoms 
will be routinely disregarded. As Hayek wrote elsewhere (1984a [1976]: 353),
Thus arose unlimited democracy . . . [from the belief] that the control of government by elected 
representatives of the majority made any other checks on the powers of government 
unnecessary, so that all the various constitutional safeguards which had been developed in the 
course of time could be dispensed with.
Similarly, Mises wrote (1981 [1922]: 64f.),
Grave injury has been done to the concept of democracy by those who, exaggerating the natural 
law notion of sovereignty, conceived it as limitless rule of the volonté générale (general will). 
There is really no essential difference between the unlimited power of the democratic state and 
the unlimited power of the autocrat. The idea that carries away our demagogues and their 
supporters, the idea that the state can do whatever it wishes, and that nothing should resist the 
will of the sovereign people, has done more evil perhaps than the caesar-mania of degenerate 
princelings. Both have the same origin in the notion of a state based purely on political might.
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If there is any constitutional restriction permitted by absolute democracy, it is that the people are forbidden to 
constrain their own popular sovereignty. The one constitutional limitation is that there cannot be any limitations 
on the exercise of democracy power even if the people desire them (cf. Talmon 1960: 205, 236); the one rule is 
that there are no rules.
This illiberal aspect of absolute democracy stands in contrast to liberal, limited democracy. According to 
Hague and Harrop (2007: 49),
[L]iberal democracy is a compromise. Specifically, it seeks to integrate the authority of 
democratic governments with simultaneous limits on their scope. By definition, liberal 
democracy is limited government. ... Elected rulers are subject to constitutions that usually 
include a statement of individual rights. ... In these respects, a liberal democracy is democracy 
disarmed.
Hayek of course would have endorsed limited democracy, for he understood democracy as a means by which to 
limit the exercise of political power. For him, democracy is only a means to facilitate the achievement of the 
good society but it is not constitutive of the good itself. On another occasion, Hayek wrote (1984a [1976]: 354),36
I must confess to preferring non-democratic government under the law to unlimited (and 
therefore essentially lawless) democratic government. Government under the law seems to me to 
be the higher value, which it was once hoped that democratic watch-dogs would preserve.
A similar preference for the rule-of-law over popular sovereignty once animated American political culture as 
well. As Edward S. Corwin (1955: 4) says of America's founding philosophy:
The attribution of supremacy to the Constitution on the ground solely of its rootage in popular 
will represents, however, a comparatively late outgrowth of American constitutional theory. 
Earlier the supremacy accorded to constitutions was ascribed less to their putative source than to 
their supposed content, to their embodiment of an essential and unchanging justice. . . . There 
are, it is predicated, certain principles of right and justice which are entitled to prevail of their 
own intrinsic excellence, all together regardless of the attitude of those who wield the physical 
resources of the community. 
This reinforces Hague and Harrop's (2007: 49), argument that the United States represents “the most liberal (and 
perhaps the least democratic) of all the liberal democracies.” According to the classical liberal conception, the 
popular will as such has no normative value. What classical liberalism demanded was justice and the protection 
of individual rights by whichever means were most expedient. Democracy had at most instrumental value as a 
means for effecting justice and peace, but it was justice and peace, not democracy, that were sought for their own 
sakes. 
This classical liberal conception is incompatible with socialism. Democratic socialism appears to 
necessarily embrace a majoritarian, unlimited, absolutist conception of democracy wherein the democratic 
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process is constitutive of the good; the good is good because it is democratic. But such a conception has little 
place for constitutional limits on power or for the protection of civil liberties, and it quickly slides into unlimited, 
illiberal democracy. If the good is whatever the democratic process decides upon, then there is nothing to protect 
minority or individual rights, for any constitutional protections would subvert absolute democracy. If 51% of the 
people decide to abolish the freedom of speech of 49% of the people, then any constitutional right to free speech 
would undermine popular sovereignty. If the will of the people is absolutely sovereign, then nothing, not even 
constitutional guarantees of individual liberty, can be allowed to obstruct that democratic will. If such 
constitutional guarantees do exist, then it is the people's rights – not their democratic will – which is sovereign. 
As Hague and Harrop say (2007: 49), “Liberal democracy is a settlement between individual liberty and 
collective politics,” but under democratic socialism, there obviously – by definition – cannot be anything to 
dilute the purity of collective politics. Talmon's (1960: 112) gloss on the French Revolution applies here as well: 
The idea of democracy implied here contains no reference to the right of opposition, to 
individual liberties or toleration, and clearly revives the ancient Greek view of democracy as the 
victory of the mass of the under-privileged over the privileged minority, and the suppression of 
the latter by the former.
Absolute sovereignty can produce an illiberal democracy by yet another route as well. It may be, not that 
51% of the people vote with the express intention to violate the rights of 49%, but instead, the majority of the 
people may vote for a demagogic populist who promises to protect and enrich the people provided only that they 
hand over to him authoritarian power. This authoritarian populist will tend to impose limitations on the freedom 
of speech in order to protect his own regime, and he will often work to ensure that the courts and judges are not 
independent of his will. Such a democracy will be illiberal, not because the people directly voted for illiberal 
policies which deliberately intended to plunder minorities at the expense of the majority, but instead, because the 
people used their sovereignty to elect a populist who proceeded to illiberally subject the press and the courts to 
his private will. The dictator may use defamation laws to silence any criticism of him. As Jacob Talmon notes 
(1960: 104f.),
The ancients have already understood, and indeed witnessed, the phenomenon of extreme 
democracy leading straight to personal tyranny. Modern experience has added one link, the role 
of the totalitarian-democratic vanguard in a plebiscitary régime, posing as the people. The 
fervour and ceaseless activity of the believers, on the one hand, and intimidation practised on 
opponents and the lukewarm, on the other, are the instruments by which the desired “general 
will” is made to appear as the will of all. Only one voice is heard, and it is voiced with such an 
insistence, vehemence, self-righteous fervour and a tone of menace that all other voices are 
drowned, cowed, and silenced.
Such things have often happened in recent decades in Latin America, for example, “with the urban poor seeking 
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salvation through a strong, populist leader” (Hague and Harrop 2007: 52). But the doctrine of absolute 
sovereignty cannot object to this populist form of illiberal democracy either. For after all, the people did elect 
this populist. Furthermore, when the populist dictator proceeds to limit the freedom of speech, it is impossible to 
object that this is illegitimate. After all, popular sovereignty excludes constitutional limitations. Therefore, it 
cannot be said that there is a constitutional guarantee of liberty of speech which the dictator is violating. 
Similarly, it cannot be objected that the courts ought to be protecting constitutional liberties against the dictator, 
and striking down his policies as violations of the rights of the people, for there cannot be such constitutional 
liberties and rights according to the doctrine of absolute democratic sovereignty. Hague and Harrop (2007: 51), 
speaking of illiberal democracy in general, state that “[b]ecause the judiciary in an illiberal democracy is under-
resourced, it is unable to enforce the individual rights documented in the constitution.” But unlimited popular 
sovereignty cannot tolerate the enumeration of any individual rights to begin with. It is not merely that the courts 
cannot enforce rights, but instead, rights cannot be specified at all, for any such enumeration would supersede 
democracy and illegitimately constrain the sovereign popular will. There cannot be anything beyond the will of 
the people to which the courts can appeal. It is the will of the people which is sovereign above all else. And since 
the dictator represents the will of the people, no court – no matter how independent – can appeal to any 
normative principle above the dictator's will. If there were any such normative principle, then sovereignty would 
necessarily be located not in the will of the people but in that normative principle which has been placed above 
the will of the people.
Under democratic socialism as well, as long as democracy is conceived in this unlimited fashion, then 
there no normative principles to appeal to above the sovereign popular will. If the government owns the printing 
presses and imposes selective censorship, what principle can anyone appeal to against this? It is the will of the 
people which is sovereign, not any individual liberties or rights. Whether the majority votes to oppress the 
minority, or whether the people elect an authoritarian populist, there is no higher principle to which one can 
appeal to object to the government's policies. But then democratic socialism cannot promise to be any less 
despotic and tyrannical than non-democratic socialism. Distinguishing between “liberal democracy of the Anglo-
Saxon and Swiss kind on the one hand and the Jacobin brand of democracy on the other,” Wilhelm Röpke (1998 
[1957]: 66) notes that the latter precludes the “metademocratic” constitutional limits imposed by the former 
(Röpke 1998 [1957]: 68). Therefore, he says (Röpke 1998 [1957]: 69),
Democracy is, in the long run, compatible with freedom only on condition that all, or at least 
most, voters are agreed that certain supreme norms and principles of public life and economic 
order must remain outside the sphere of democratic decisions.
But democratic socialism necessarily rests on the illiberal principle that nothing is outside the sphere of 
democratic decisions.
By any conception of democracy, then, democratic socialism is incoherent. If democracy is a means to 
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limit power, then it is incompatible with the unlimited power which socialism necessarily requires for its 
implementation. And if democracy is an end unto itself, constitutive of the good, then it cannot tolerate 
constitutional limits on democratic or socialist power which restrict the exercise of socialism or democracy in 
order to protect individual rights. If democracy is itself constitutive of the good, then illiberal outcomes of 
democracy must be accepted as necessarily good. In either case, democratic socialism is unable to promise that 
individual rights will be protected. 
But the democratic socialists have taken little notice of this problem. As Lavoie (1985a: 137) notes in his 
survey of their literature, “[i]n all these articles and books there is no coherent argument about why we should 
expect the political changes implicit in national planning somehow not to lead to a drastic centralization of 
political and economic power. Instead, there is simply a strong emphasis on the virtues of democratic or local or 
collective decision-making.”
5. The Impossibility of Agreeing on a Plan
As if this were not enough, there is in fact yet another another problem with democratic socialism. As 
Hayek argued (2007 [1944]: 106f.),
Nor can a coherent plan be achieved by breaking it up into parts and voting on particular issues. 
A democratic assembly voting and amending a comprehensive economic plan clause by clause, 
as it deliberates on an ordinary bill, makes nonsense. An economic plan, to deserve the name, 
must have a unitary conception. Even if a parliament could, proceeding step by step, agree on 
some scheme, it would certainly in the end satisfy nobody. A complex whole in which all the 
parts must be most carefully adjusted to each other cannot be achieved through a compromise 
between conflicting views. . . . Even if, by this expedient, a democracy should succeed in 
planning every sector of economic activity, it would still have to face the problem of integrating 
these separate plans into a unitary whole. Many separate plans do not make a planned whole. 
In other words, democracy cannot produce the unitary economic planning which socialism demands. Democratic 
socialism would furnish only a disjointed hodge-podge of contradictory laws and regulations which have no 
unifying theme or purpose, defeating the purpose of socialism. David Schweickart, an advocate of economic 
democracy, admits the problem as well, saying (1992: 23),
Although the society is democratic, it would not be feasible to attempt a popular vote on each 
investment project. Not only does the sheer number of projects render such a procedure 
unworkable, but it would negate a major benefit of socialized investment: the conscious 
adoption of a reasonably coordinated, coherent set of investment priorities
Hayek and Schweickart seem to agree: a transitory elected government composed of disagreeing factions cannot 
produce a coherent, consistent plan. No consensus will be forthcoming where “there exists no agreed view on 
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what ought to be done” (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 101).
Democracy may be workable for the management and regulation of a free-market economy simply 
because the government's activities are so restricted. A “night-watchman” state has far less to do than a socialist 
state. In other words, the smaller the scope of government, the simpler the task of achieving democratic 
consensus. But socialism dramatically expands the scope of government to embrace all aspects of life 
whatsoever. Nothing approaching a consensus can be obtained when the government's scope is so expanded to 
embrace all aspects of life. Whereas markets promote diversity and pluralism, governance demands uniformity. 
The more government supplants markets, the more uniformity replaces diversity. Greater reliance on government 
means that people cannot be allowed to go their own way, but more and more people must somehow produce an 
agreement or consensus on more and more subjects. “[T]he probability that they [those attempting to achieve a 
democratic consensus] will agree on a particular course of action necessarily decreases as the scope of such 
action extends” (Hayek 2007 [1944]:103). “We may rely on voluntary agreement to guide the action of the state 
only so long as it is confined to spheres where agreement exists” (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 103). But in pursuing a 
socialist policy, “democracy embarks upon a course of planning which in its execution requires more agreement 
than in fact exists” (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 103).37 The problem is that under socialism (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 104),
the agreement on the desirability of planning is not supported by agreement on the ends the plan 
is to serve. The effect of the people's agreeing that there must be central planning, without 
agreeing on the ends, will be rather as if a group of people were to commit themselves to take a 
journey together without agreeing where they want to go: with the result that they may all have 
to make a journey which most of them do not want at all. 
Indeed, John Jewkes shows that the central economic plans of Britain's Labour and Conservative parties 
were all mutually-contradictory (Jewkes 1968: 80-96, 1978: 61-76). Everyone agreed they wanted planning but 
nobody agreed what the plan should be. Because no consensus can ever be reached, democratic socialism must 
and did essentially devolve into interest-group-lobbying, where every faction strives to funnel pork to its own 
constituents. As John Jewkes noted, the minister of a regime of central economic planning “will be subject to 
powerful pressure groups” which will “inevitably make him the guardian of some vested interest” (Jewkes 1968: 
130). No coherent central plan can arise from this, according to Jewkes (1968: 133; cf. ibid. 218):
an integrated scheme must inevitably be examined by those whose interests and knowledge are 
essentially local and piecemeal. The plan will be subjected to distortion through the activities of 
pressure groups.
And so (to quote a statement made in an unrelated context: “Thresher” 174) the product of democratic socialism 
will be “one big compromise, just like a bill in the Assembly that no one wants to pass but no one is willing to 
kill. The thing gets modified and diddled in committee until it's equally unacceptable to everyone.” Therefore, as 
Nicholas Capaldi and Gordon Lloyd have noted (2011: p. xxi, n. 4), “Marxists have always been rightly 
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contemptuous of democratic socialism because shifting majorities literally makes even the façade of economic 
planning impossible.”
Interestingly, Michael Harrington seems to have caught a glimpse of this problem, saying (1978: 443),
[D]ebates over priorities . . . would be resolved by a democratic process in which parties would 
compete with one another over conflicting programs. That, however, would not mean a mere 
extension of present-day “pluralist” theory, which ignores the way formal democratic rights, 
precious as they are, can be subverted by economic and social inequalities.
But Harrington does not explain how democratic socialism would avoid the pitfalls of democratic pluralism. He 
even admits (1978: 446), “I am positing the necessity of conflict among organizations that would interpret the 
common good in terms of the particular good of different strata of the citizenry.” After this admission, it is not 
clear what there is left of democratic socialism to salvage.
6. The Problem of Special Interest Lobbying (Rent-Seeking): Two Interpretations
In some respects, the foregoing analysis by Hayek and Jewkes is similar to that of Shleifer and Vishny, 
but there are important distinctions to be drawn. According to Shleifer and Vishny, the problem with market 
socialism is that it is vulnerable to the influence of pressure groups. Citing the standard Public Choice literature, 
they argue that under market socialism, the government will cater to well-organized minority interests rather 
than promote the public good, creating economic inefficiencies (Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 171f.).38 They 
concede that the same problem exists under democratic capitalism, but they claim that the inefficiencies would 
be greater under democratic socialism (Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 172-174). Similarly, Don Lavoie (1985a: 131) 
notes that many advocates of democratic socialism are rightly critical of rent-seeking and special-interest 
privileges but he avers this problem “is likely to be worsened in a regime in which a single national planning 
office is given greater governmental power.”
Contrary to the claim that Hayek was ignorant of Public Choice arguments such as these, Peter Boettke 
has noted (1995: 10) that Hayek also understood the logic of “concentrated benefits, dispersed costs.” 
Furthermore, Hayek realized that this issue of special-interest lobbying and privilege is related to our previously 
discussed problem of unlimited, majoritarian democracy. Absolute democracy does not always or even 
necessarily usually result in the majority's oppressing the minority. Instead, it sometimes results in the very 
opposite, where minorities log-roll together to obtain special privileges for themselves. Hayek wrote (1984b 
[1976]: 125), “Omnipotent democracy indeed leads of necessity to a kind of socialism, but to a socialism which 
nobody foresaw or probably wanted . . . [operating on] the power of those persons or groups [in the minority] to 
extort special benefits from the government [of the majority].” Furthermore, Hayek said (1984a [1976]: 356f.),
In such a democratically elected assembly with unlimited power to confer special benefits and 
impose special burdens on particular groups, a majority can be formed only by buying the 
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support of numerous special interests, through granting them such benefits at the expense of a 
minority. . . . It is the result of this bargaining process which is dignified as the 'will of the 
majority.' . . . [N]o genuine agreement among a majority exists, but for which the support of a 
majority has been obtained by deals. . . . In an omnipotent assembly which is concerned mainly 
with particulars and not with principles, majorities are therefore not based on agreement of 
opinions, but are formed by aggregations of special interests mutually assisting each other.
Hayek's argument poses a special challenge to the theory of deliberative democracy, according to which (Hague 
and Harrop 2007: 46f.)
we should view democracy as a method of communication. ... In an open debate arguments 
based on private interests are soon recognized and discounted; public reason involves appeal to 
the public good. ... In such conditions, a consensus should emerge about what is truly in the 
public interest, with reason triumphing over interests. 
This theory presumes that majorities are “based on agreement of opinions . . . [whereas in fact, they] are formed 
by aggregations of special interests mutually assisting each other” (Hayek 1984a [1976]: 357). Hague and 
Harrop (2007: 47) incisively point out that “few advocates of deliberative democracy offer specific guidance on 
institutional arrangements to secure their objective.”
However, there is an important nuance in Hayek's and Jewkes's argument which the foregoing analysis 
omits, extending beyond the logic of interest group privileges and rent-seeking. Unlike Shleifer and Vishny, 
Hayek and Jewkes do not merely argue that interest group lobbying will lead to more economic inefficiency. 
Instead, Hayek's and Jewkes's argument is more fundamental: the outcome of interest group lobbying at all is 
fundamentally at odds with the very essence and intention of socialism. Central economic planning only makes 
sense if there is a unitary, consistent, coherent central plan. The very existence of conflicting interest groups 
which influence government, regardless of the magnitude of the inefficiency they engender, defeats the very 
purpose of socialism. 
One of the fundamental Marxist criticisms of the market had been that the market economy is an 
“anarchy of production” which must be replaced with conscious, rational direction. Socialists found it 
unconscionable that the market was being driven by price-signals which seemed to emerge from nowhere. Only 
a consciously-designed system, they thought, was deserving of rational human beings. Many socialists were 
concerned not only with inequality and poverty but also with the fact that the unplanned spontaneous order of 
the market economy seemed irrational and inscrutable. It was unjust that rational human beings had to obey 
irrational price signals. Only socialism – the conscious, central direction of the economy – would allow man to 
finally live as man and not animal, guiding his own destiny, living rationally according to his own will. The 
anarchy of production was an existential injustice which made a mockery of humankind, as Engels made clear in 
Socialism: Utopian and Scientific (Engels 1892 [1890]: ch. 3):
35
But when once [the] nature [economic and productive forces are] understood, they can, in the 
hands of the producers working together, be transformed from master demons into willing 
servants. . . . [We will]  subject them more and more to our own will, and by means of them to 
reach our own ends. . . . With the seizing of the means of production by society, production of 
commodities is done away with, and, simultaneously, the mastery of the product over the 
producer. Anarchy in social production is replaced by systematic, definite organization. The 
struggle for individual existence disappears. Then, for the first time, man, in a certain sense, is 
finally marked off from the rest of the animal kingdom, and emerges from mere animal 
conditions of existence into really human ones. The whole sphere of the conditions of life which 
environ man, and which have hitherto ruled man, now comes under the dominion and control of 
man, who for the first time becomes the real, conscious lord of nature, because he has now 
become master of his own social organization. The laws of his own social action, hitherto 
standing face-to-face with man as laws of Nature foreign to, and dominating him, will then be 
used with full understanding, and so mastered by him. Man's own social organization, hitherto 
confronting him as a necessity imposed by Nature and history, now becomes the result of his 
own free action. The extraneous objective forces that have, hitherto, governed history,pass under 
the control of man himself. Only from that time will man himself, more and more consciously, 
make his own history — only from that time will the social causes set in movement by him 
have, in the main and in a constantly growing measure, the results intended by him. It is the 
ascent of man from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom. 
For socialists, abolishing the anarchy of production took on cosmic importance. It was not merely about 
achieving social justice. It was about freeing mankind from an animal existence and finally letting it live as 
human beings. The abolition of capitalism meant mankind would be free to fulfill its destiny as rational beings. 
As David Ramsay Steele (1992: 39-43), this abhorrence to the anarchy of production is related to the critique of 
commodity fetishism. “For Marx, commodity fetishism is something which always arises automatically from the 
fact that the market is unplanned” (Steele 1992: 40). Steele (1992: 41) argues that for Marx, this is more 
important than material inequality:
It is this absence of control by human beings of their individual and collective destinies which is 
the true source of the pathos of Capital. Readers impressed primarily by the documented 
physical deprivation and squalor have read it superficially. Capital is a saga of the mysterious, 
macabre adventures that befall people who have lost conscious control of their collective lives.
But, Steele (1992: 43), “Marx never considers that the fetishism of commodities maybe no odder than the 
fetishism of committees.” 
Therefore, Hayek's and Jewkes's criticism cuts closer to the heart of the matter than Shleifer's and 
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Vishny's. Shleifer and Vishny predict that interest group lobbying will engender economic inefficiency, but 
conceivably, a socialist could be willing to tolerate greater economic inefficiency if this maximized other, more 
important goals, such as income equality. In fact, properly understood, this would not entail economic 
inefficiency at all, because efficiency means the satisfaction of one's goals at least cost. If one's goal is income 
equality, then it may be efficient to sacrifice wealth maximization in favor of equality. In rent-seeking and the 
conferral of privileges for special interests somehow promoted equality, then this might actually be efficient. But 
according to Hayek and Jewkes, interest groups would produce not merely economic inefficiency but 
directionless and incoherent anarchy. Similarly, Lavoie (1985a: 161) says about the democratic socialists that, 
“To the extent that they insist on genuinely decentralized decision-making they are proposing the arbitrary and 
uncoordinated injection of contradictory policies by all levels and departments of government. In other words 
they have a prescription for chaos, not rational planning.” 
If Hayek and Jewkes are correct, it is not merely that socialism is inefficient, as Shleifer and Vishny 
claim. Instead, socialism utterly fails its aspiration to enable man to live according to reason. The existence of 
rent-seeking under socialism means that mankind will fail to elevate itself beyond the animal reliance on the 
forces of nature. If socialism means chaotic jockeying among interest groups with an irrational, indeterminate 
outcome, then man is still a slave to forces beyond his control. The inconvenience of economic inefficiency pales 
against the cosmic injustice of the anarchy of production which would remain unresolved under socialism.
Whereas Shleifer and Vishny rely on Mancur Olson (1965) and Gary Becker (1983) for their model of 
regulation, Hayek's and Jewkes's theory of incoherence and instability of decision-making under democratic 
socialism appears to be an example of the general problem of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem (Boettke and 
Leeson 2002, Boettke 1995: 19). Arrow showed that it is impossible to aggregate a multitude of individually 
ordinal and transitive preference functions into one single ordinal-transitive social preference function. The only 
means by which the political preference function can satisfy all of Arrow's conditions is through dictatorship 
(Butler 2012: 32; Stevens 1993: 47, 143-145; Hinich and Munger 1997: 95-99). Arrow showed mathematically 
that any possible voting rule whatsoever will be susceptible to one of several paradoxes. The problem is that 
given individually transitive and ordinal preferences, there is no mathematically-guaranteed way to aggregate 
them together into one social preference function that is free of paradoxes. The only way to avoid the paradoxes, 
according to Arrow, is through dictatorship since this avoids the need to aggregate individual preference 
functions into one social preference function. The wider the scope of government, and the more authority 
democratic institutions are entrusted with, the more likely an Arrow paradox is to occur. The wider the scope of 
government, the more likely one will have to resort to dictatorship to guarantee rational governance.
The Arrow theorem poses a grave dilemma for democratic socialism. What socialism fundamentally 
aims to accomplish is the transformation of society from what Michael Oakeshott (1975) called a “civil 
association” of shared means – such as private property and the rule-of-law – intended to enable all its members 
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to pursue their own happiness as they individually define it for themselves, into an “enterprise association” of a 
single set of shared ends common to all members of society. It is doubtful whether this goal is morally desirable 
or whether it is compatible with individual freedom, for the rule-of-law as Hayek understood it can exist only in 
what Oakeshott called a civic association (Capaldi and Lloyd 2011: xxiii). But even if – for the sake of argument 
– we assume that this transformation of society into an enterprise association is compatible with liberty and 
individual rights, the fact is that the Arrow paradox means that it is impossible for democratic institutions to 
successfully accomplish this transformation. Democratic institutions, subject to the Arrow paradox, are unable to 
translate diverse individual ends into a single set of shared ends. This is not so damaging for capitalistic or 
market-based institutions, because these have the more modest purpose of maintaining society as a mere civic 
association. Since the goal of such institutions is not to unite society behind one single set of ends, their 
effectiveness is not undermined as much by the Arrow paradox. But because democratic socialism intends to 
unite society behind some single set of shared ends and to transform society into an enterprise association, the 
Arrow paradox is particularly fatal to democratic socialism. Only dictatorship is consistently capable of 
accomplishing socialism's call to transform society from a civic to an enterprise association.
Similarly, Hayek and Jewkes do not merely say that pressure groups will create economic inefficiencies. 
Their criticism is more fundamental: the unitary, coherent, consistent plan demanded by socialism simply cannot 
be obtained under democracy. Democratic socialism cannot work because there is no way to deduce societal 
preferences or the one and only “general will.” Just as Mises showed that socialism cannot economically 
calculate the optimal production decisions, likewise, Hayek, Jewkes, and Arrow showed that neither can 
socialism “calculate” the will of the people or the optimal political policy without resorting to dictatorship. If we 
interpret Hayek's argument as a form of the Arrow theorem, then we can understand his claim that the chaos and 
incoherency of democratic economic planning will tend to conclude with the people demanding the appointment 
of a dictator who can bypass the legislature and finally “get things done.” 
The point here is not that democratic socialism must necessarily be dictatorial, but rather that it must be 
dictatorial in order to produce a unitary socialist economic plan. Contrariwise, democratic socialism may eschew 
dictatorship but in doing so, it creates the possibility that the central economic plan will be incoherent and 
random. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem states that one may eliminate paradoxes only at the cost of dictatorship 
and that one may avoid dictatorship only at the cost of suffering democratic paradoxes. This undermines the 
“naive view of democratic governance [which] dominated discourse” at the time of Hayek and Jewkes and 
refutes the notion that “[t]he voting process unambiguously conveyed the necessary information” (Boettke 1995: 
15).
7. What Happens in the Next Election?
Now, let us suppose that somehow, against all odds, a democratic socialist government has succeeded in 
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planning the economy without resorting to any authoritarianism or dictatorship. There is one crucial fact which 
the democratic socialists appear to have neglected: democracy entails periodic elections. We certainly cannot 
assume the democratic socialists will always win. So what happens if during the next election, the people vote 
against the incumbent party? Some capital investments take years or decades to bear fruit, before they deliver the 
hoped-for return-on-investment. What if four years after a plan is inaugurated, a new party is elected and uproots 
that tree before it has had a chance to blossom? How could any economic coherence or consistency be 
maintained if elections constantly upend the entire economy? For “[l]ong-term industrial projects cannot flourish 
in such an environment of political uncertainty,” according to Jewkes (1968: 166). 
And how could democratic socialism be maintained if the people voted against socialism and in favor of 
a free-market? Or what if the people continued to vote for socialism in general, but chose to elect a competing, 
alternative socialist party with a central plan differing from that of the incumbent socialist party? How can a 
long-term economic plan be maintained if it is replaced every time a new party comes to power? As Jewkes 
(1968: 166, 152, 166) argued,
Even where one planning government is succeeded by another, sudden switches of policy are to 
be expected. . . . If the personnel of the supreme planning group changes, then disrupting and 
costly changes in policy will follow. Even greater dislocation is to be expected where a socialist 
government, committed to planning, is replaced by a non-socialist government which favours 
the free economy. So long as representative government is maintained this possibility cannot be 
ruled out. . . . The prospect is thus opened up of chaotic competition between rival plans. 
And so, said Jewkes (1968: 152, 166f.). , democratic socialism could not operate 
Unless . . . the highly undemocratic assumption is made that the government will never change 
the political colour of its government. . . . There is no escape from a dilemma unless one party is 
has the courage of its conviction and, in the interests of the continuity of its economic 
programmes, deprives the electorate of the right to change the government.”
In fact, some of the advocates of democratic socialism themselves did not shy away from this anti-democratic 
conclusion. As Hayek (2007 [1944]: 105) noted:
to make it quite clear that a socialist government must not allow itself to be too fettered by 
democratic procedure, Professor Laski . . . raised the question “whether in a period of transition 
to Socialism, a Labour Government can risk the overthrow of its measures as a result of the next 
general election” - and left it significantly unanswered.
And further (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 105n4),
Professor Laski [expressed] his determination that parliamentary democracy must not be 
allowed to form an obstacle to the realization of socialism . . . “the continuance of parliamentary 
government would depend on its [i.e. the Labour government's] possession of guarantees from 
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the Conservative Party that its work of transformation would not be disrupted by repeal in the 
event of its defeat at the polls”! 
The problem is especially severe for Michael Walzer (1978: 358, 2010) who, as we have seen, equates 
democratic socialism – or “socialism-in-the-making” – with the democratic process. What happens if the people 
vote for capitalism or laissez-faire? Or what if they vote for fascism? Is this still socialism? And we already saw 
that absolute, unlimited democracy allows the people to elect an authoritarian despot who is unencumbered by 
any constitutional restrictions on the exercise of his power. In general, the coherency and consistency of any 
socialist plan is threatened by unpredictable political changes, and democracy does nothing less than to 
institutionalize and systematize such unpredictability.
Robert A. Dahl's (1985) defense of workplace democracy suffers from a similar dilemma. As Mayer 
(2001: 230) notes, according to Dahl, “The fact that [non-democratic workplace management] is sanctioned 
today by majority rule and majority opinion is no justification, for moral rights cannot legitimately be suspended 
by a show of hands.” So apparently, democracy is to be the ruling concept, except when the people 
democratically reject democracy. Then democracy is invalid. The people must have democracy even they 
democratically declare that they do not want it (cf. Talmon 1960: 205, 236). The liberal conception – which we 
have discussed earlier – that democracy is subordinate to the protection of individual rights – and that popular 
sovereignty is not unlimited – is strangely invoked just once: if the people vote to reject unlimited popular 
sovereignty, then their vote is nugatory because the people have a right to unlimited sovereignty which they are 
not allowed to democratically reject. Heads, Dahl wins; tails, the people lose. 
These considerations suggest that any attempt to implement democratic socialism may wind up traveling 
back down the road paved by Robespierre's Terror during the French Revolution. Green (1986)'s review of 
Dahl's (1985) advocacy of compulsory workplace democracy is revealing: the reason “why historically men 
came to demand liberty, or limited government . . . was because centuries of experience had taught that 
governments which set out to create the good life for their people ended up by forcing one conception of the 
good life on them.” As Jacob Talmon (1960) shows, the followers of Rousseau really did believe in individual 
liberty and human rights. The failure of the French Revolution had nothing to do with with a disregard for liberal 
individualism. Instead, Talmon argues, the problem was that the French philosophes assumed that there was one 
natural order which best accorded with human nature, and they were confident that this natural order was a self-
evident, Cartesian truth (cf. Hayek 1948: 1-32). Rousseau and Robespierre were sure that majoritarian 
democracy would unerringly result in a unanimous discovery and ratification of the General Will. Because the 
truth was so obvious, they simply could not conceive of the possibility that factions and disagreements might 
persist under democracy. When not everyone agreed with Robespierre on what the General Will was – and the 
truth was, remember, self-evident – the only conclusion he could draw was that some people were simply evil or 
stupid. In such a case, it was consistent with human rights and liberties to follow Rousseau's counsel to “force 
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people to be free” – to force people to live in accordance with the self-evidently true and best lifestyle. The rest, 
of course, is history. 
Bryan Caplan (n.d. #1) shows that something similar happened to the anarchists during the Spanish Civil 
War: the anarchists were forced to resort to state-socialism to implement their scheme. But, says Caplan, this was 
not because the anarchists were insincere in their denunciations of state violence and compulsion. The anarchists 
really did mean everything they said when they rejected the Weberian state (Caplan n.d. #1; cf. Caplan n.d. #2 
s.v. “9. How would left-anarchy work?”). The problem was that they assumed that anarchism would successfully 
accomplish their socialist aims. But when they implemented workplace democracy, they discovered that some 
factories were materially furnished better than others. The workers in some factories thus obtained higher 
incomes than others (Caplan n.d. #1; cf. Mises 1981 [1922]: 238, 242). This was not what the anarchists 
envisioned. There were two solutions: either the anarchists could hold true to their anarchism and let things be, 
or else they could create a Weberian state and compel the richer factories to subsidize the incomes of the workers 
of the poorer factories. In the end, the anarchists took the second route, and their socialist aims prevailed over 
their anarchist means (Caplan n.d. #1). They had to create a state to redistribute incomes when their anarchist 
workplace democracy did not produce the outcomes which they had expected. 
Similarly, one wonders whether the democratic socialists have ever conceived of the possibility that they 
might actually lose an election!39 What will they do if the people vote for capitalism? Will the democratic 
socialists accept this democratic outcome, or will they insist that socialism must be implemented at all costs, 
even if this means abandoning democracy? Like the French philosophes, the democratic socialists have assumed 
that everyone will vote for what they believe they ought to. But when the people vote differently, what will the 
democratic socialists do? A democratic socialist cannot legitimately specify both the means of democracy and 
the end of socialism, for this is an illegitimate act of what Michael Novak (1986: 172) terms “definitional 
imperialism,” where one defines a given set of means as accomplishing a given set of ends.40 One may indeed 
hypothesize that a given set of means will accomplish a given set of ends, but when it comes time to verify the 
hypothesis, one must make a choice: either means or ends. Either one implements democracy and discovers 
whether the hypothesis is verified – that is, whether the people indeed turn out to choose socialism as 
hypothesized – or else one decides upon socialism and then chooses to implement whichever means will 
successfully produce that given end, even if it turns out that those means are necessarily anti-democratic, 
contrary to the original hypothesis. So to pose the question again: if it turns out that the people will not vote for 
socialism, what will the democratic socialists choose? Will they choose non-socialist democracy or non-
democratic socialism? Will they simply become plain democrats, accepting whatever the people have willed, 
even if it has nothing to do with socialism? Or will they become Soviet-style socialists, relying on a vanguard 
party to implement the true General Will and compel the people to be free? Surely the people will thank them 
later . . . right? 
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8. International Economic Integration: Where Goods Do Not Cross Borders, Armies Will
Our final reason for the incoherence of democratic socialism is the deleterious effects it would have on 
international relations. By virtue of its socialist nature, a thoroughgoing democratic socialism would seriously 
disrupt international trade and threaten peaceful foreign relations, possibly even giving rise to warfare, but 
certainly leading to tense relations. Insofar as democratic socialists strive for peace and the protection of human 
rights, these foreign policy consequences are incompatible with the goals of democratic socialism.
This argument was made most clearly by Ludwig von Mises (1985 [1944], esp. ch. 3, pt. 4-10)41 and by 
Gustav Cassel (1934), but it is compatible with Hayek's analysis. Indeed, Hayek approvingly cites both Mises 
and Cassel (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 239f.).42 Focusing on the socialist attitude towards international commerce, 
Mises and Cassel argue that militancy, belligerency, and bellicosity are logical consequences of the consistent 
pursuit of socialism. Being a market-based activity, international trade is opposed to the values of socialism. As 
such foreign commerce is ideologically anathema, the truly socialist state is necessarily autarkic (Mises 1985 
[1944], Osterfeld 1992: 7).43 
Furthermore, foreign trade reduces national sovereignty by ceding economic power to the foreign 
trading partner (Mises 1985 [1944], Osterfeld 1992: 181f.). No government can exercise power beyond the 
territory subject to its own sovereignty. Imports must be paid for with exports, and purchasing imports requires 
producing goods for exports which satisfy foreigners. This means the government's domestic economic plan 
must satisfy the whims of fickle foreigners who are not subject to the government's sovereignty. 
Meanwhile, freedom of international trade allows foreign competition to undermine and defeat domestic 
intervention and regulation. Freedom of trade between two states limits the ability of the governments of either 
one of those two states to intervene in their domestic economies. A government cannot successfully intervene in 
its domestic market unless it is insulated from foreign markets. For example, if a state wishes to boost domestic 
wages in a given industry by establishing minimum wages or legally privileging unions, then it must establish 
trade barriers to keep foreign states from undercutting those wages by offering cheaper goods. Contrariwise, 
when a state is unable to impose such barriers to trade, its ability to domestically intervene is limited because 
any attempt at domestic intervention will too quickly prove itself to be self-defeating. For example, when the 
state of Washington tried to legally favor unions, Boeing responded by voting with its feet and relocating to the 
“right to work” state of South Carolina. In such a case, it is too obvious that domestic intervention was 
responsible for undesirable consequences. But had Boeing been forbidden to vacate Washington, it would have 
been more difficult for voters to discern that legal regulations had artificially raised the cost of business. Trade 
restrictions are resorted to as a form of cost-concealment, a means by which foreigners are forbidden to expose 
the manner in which domestic interventionism has raised costs and reduced productivity.
Hence, where there is freedom of international trade, conditions in foreign markets will tend to 
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undermine and disrupt the domestic central plan of the socialist state and expose it vacuousness. Where 
international trade is unrestricted, domestic intervention will too quickly prove self-defeating Therefore, under 
thoroughly consistent socialism, foreign trade must be limited if not entirely precluded so that the state can plan 
with confidence without its sovereignty being undermined. But if imports are banned, then the state must 
militarily conquer those territories which possess desired resources (Mises 1985 [1944], Cassel 1934). The 
logical consequence of such autarky is therefore militant expansionism. Hence, the Nazi pursuit of Lebensraum, 
“living space.” 
Lord Percy of Newcastle (1955) offered a similar analysis of this dynamic, arguing that absolute 
democracy – sovereignty of the popular will – leads to nationalism, which in turn restricts foreign relations. 
According to Percy (1955: 61), “the very idea of a constitution is essentially repugnant to the pure democrat.” 
Further,“a sovereign people must not allow its own decrees of yesterday to limit its freedom to meet the needs of 
today. . . . Thus the incompatibility of unmixed democracy with settled law” (Percy 1955: 50). Popular 
sovereignty cannot tolerate any limitations on its own democratic authority. But the General Will cannot easily 
be determined or expressed except at the local level (Percy 1955: 56, 62). One solution to this dilemma is 
nationalism (Percy 1955: 75-110). The sovereign people is united by a common nationality and the 
constitutionally unlimited General Will is expressed at the national level. But such nationalism quickly leads to a 
closed economic democracy which turns to belligerency and militarism. According to Percy (1955: 99f.),
[M]ost of the members of the new family of nations, created by the Peace of Versailles . . . 
existed, so the argument had run, because their peoples were entitled to sovereignty. If their 
governors could not find a way to be democratic nationalists, they were bound to try to assert 
themselves as economic nationalists. For the corporate franchises and the international dealings 
of world capitalism are the most irritating possible challenges to the claim of a sovereign people 
to sole power within its own territory. An economic democracy must be a closed system; hence 
Marx's thesis that it could be established only in a World state as the result of an international 
revolution. ... Thus, to vary the metaphor, the best diagnosis of the convulsions of Europe 
between the wars is that they were the result of economic shock, operating on a constitution 
undermined by the peculiar religious mania of nationalism.
In short, both unlimited democracy and socialism lead to national socialism.. Neither unlimited democracy nor 
socialism nor nationalism can tolerate foreign interference in domestic economic planning nor can they allow 
diminution of domestic popular sovereignty. Therefore, insofar as they are followed consistently to their logical 
ends, they all lead to autarky, belligerency, and militarism. 
Woodrow Wilson was wrong: it is not true that democracies never go to war against each other simply 
because they are democracies. If anything, unlimited democracies will go to war more often because their 
nationalism demands economic autarky. If there is any nation which is less likely to go to war, it is those nations 
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which permit international free-trade at the expense of popular or national sovereignty. If democracies have in 
fact been less less likely to go to war, it is because they have tended to be liberal democracies, but as we have 
seen, the liberal aspect operates as a limiting check on the democratic element (Hague and Harrop 2007: 49). 
Liberal democracies have been unlikely to go to war because they have been more liberal than democratic.
It is for such reasons that Hayek argued in the Road to Serfdom (2007 [1944]) that German National 
Socialism was not a corruption or departure from socialism. Instead, the Nazis had merely pursued socialism to 
its logical conclusion. According to Hayek, the Nazis had simply been more willing than the German Social 
Democrats to use whatever means were necessary to implement socialism (Hayek 2007: 146, 160, 182). Lord 
Percy called the Germans “an insurgent people, claiming the 'right to work' in a territory sufficiently extended, 
and a State effectively socialized, for that purpose” (Percy 1955: 103; cf. 105). 
We can summarize this extended argument with the Manchester School's aphorism that “Where goods 
do not cross borders, armies will.” Domestic economic intervention cannot succeed without international 
isolation and restriction of trade. Foreigners cannot be allowed to undercut and circumvent domestic regulation. 
But this in turn leads to warfare. Thus, Nazi/Soviet military expansionism was merely a consequence of socialist 
economic policy pursued consistently to its final implications. At best, if warfare is avoided, then domestic 
interventionism leads to complete isolation and insularity; nearly all contact with foreigners must be restricted in 
order to safeguard the integrity of the domestic economic plan. Democratic socialism must restrict international 
trade and foreign relations in order to ensure the effectiveness of the central plan and protect the people's 
democratic popular sovereignty. But this would give rise to consequences in foreign policy contrary to the 
cosmopolitan and humanitarian values of the democratic socialists. Democratic socialism is inconsistent with 
international multiculturalism, and it requires discriminating against foreigners – treating them as something 
other than one's fellow human beings possessing equal rights and dignity.
IV. CONCLUSION
To summarize, there are at least five political reasons why democratic socialism is incoherent and why it 
is inconsistent with the protection of individual rights and liberties. None of these reasons rest on the argument 
that economic calculation is impossible under socialism; for the sake of argument, we could assume that Lange-
Lerner-Taylor were correct and that Mises-Hayek were wrong, and we would still have to conclude that 
democratic socialism is impossible, in the sense that it cannot accomplish its purpose. First, because without 
differential wages, labor cannot be allocated without politically assigning people to their occupations. In other 
words, socialism requires the abolition of the freedom to choose one's own job and home. Otherwise, the 
government cannot ensure that the economic plan will be executed as intended. For the same reason, no 
government may tax and regulate incomes and occupations and simultaneously demand a given level of 
production and employment by that industry without resorting to command and compulsion. To maintain the 
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freedom of occupation, wages must be free to vary as much as they do under capitalism, but then it is doubtful 
what purpose socialism will serve. This is a more general case of Milton Friedman's (1962) argument that 
political and economic freedom cannot be dissociated (cf. Lawson and Clark 2010). Individual freedom depends 
on the free operation of the price-mechanism.
Second, democratic socialism is incoherent and self-defeating because democracy is merely a means to 
the end of limiting power, but socialism necessarily requires unlimited power. The means and the end are 
incompatible and one must be sacrificed to the other. This contradiction can be avoided by defining democracy 
instead as an end unto itself: the government should execute the will of the people simply because popular 
sovereignty is defines the good. But this precludes the imposition or maintenance of any constitutional restraints 
on the exercise of government power, and it will result in totalitarian or illiberal democracy. Whether democracy 
is conceived as a means or as an end, either way, democratic socialism is inconsistent with limited government 
and guaranteed protection of the individual rights of minorities.
Third, democratic socialism is incoherent because democracy inevitably results in government by 
shifting majorities, where majorities are cobbled together by log-rolling minorities together and through grants 
of pork-barrel and privileges for special interests. Hence, according to Hayek (2007 [1944]) and Jewkes (1968 
[1948]), democratic socialism cannot furnish the unitary, long-term, consistent planning which socialism 
demands. Socialism aims to transform society from what Oakeshott called a civil association of shared means 
into an enterprise association of shared ends, but Hayek and Jewkes showed this is impossible for democratic 
institutions to accomplish. This is a variant of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem (Boettke 1995, Boettke and 
Leeson 2002). According to Shleifer and Vishny (1994), the problem with socialism is simply that it would 
engender rent-seeking and economically inefficient resource allocation. But Hayek and Jewkes argue that 
interest groups pose a more serious problem for democratic socialism than simple economic inefficiency: they 
magnify Arrow's Paradox and render impossible the unitary, rational planning which is the sine qua non of 
socialism.
Contrary to Shleifer and Vishny (1994), the problem with democratic socialism is not only that those in 
power would pursue their own rational self-interest, putting their own self-interest and personal welfare above 
the correct and faithful implementation of the central economic plan. Nor is the problem only that pressure 
groups create the economic inefficiencies familiar to scholars who have studied rent-seeking. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1994) make familiar Public Choice arguments which are definitely correct and important, but Hayek and 
Jewkes go further. According to them, democratic socialism cannot work as socialists intend even if those in 
power have the best of intentions and never abuse their power. Even if the politicians are perfectly benevolent 
and other-regarding, democratic socialism must still necessarily fail to accomplish its goals. The existence of 
pressure groups under democratic socialism would not merely produce economic inefficiencies of rent-seeking – 
which a socialist could conceivably accept as an acceptable price to pay for the achievement of other goals – but 
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the problem of pressure groups would more fundamentally undermine the very purpose of socialism. Democracy 
is incompatible with socialism's demand for a single, unitary economic plan, and as Hayek and Arrow showed, 
achievement of that plan is not possible without dictatorship. The Arrow paradox says that either democratic 
socialism will be random and incoherent, or else it will be dictatorial.
Fourth, the democratic socialists have not sufficiently accounted for the possibility that they might lose 
an election. If the people vote for socialism, then well and good. But what if the people vote for capitalism? 
What then? In such a case, the democratic socialists can become either plain democrats – accepting the non-
socialist outcome as good and acceptable simply because it is the will of the people – or else they can – like 
Robespierre following Rousseau – form a vanguard party and compel the people to be free. Either the 
democratic socialists must become plain democrats or else they must resort to Soviet-style command socialism.
Finally, democratic socialism or economic democracy is – like economic nationalism – incompatible 
with cosmopolitanism and international peace. Domestic interventionism cannot be sustained as long as imports 
are allowed undermine the plan. Thorough domestic interventionism is impossible without protectionism and 
national self-sufficiency. This in turn must result in either bellicosity, belligerency, and warfare, or else 
isolationism and complete disregard for foreigners. Either way, democratic socialism is therefore inconsistent 
with a philosophy which regards all human beings around the world as essentially equal in rights and dignity.
Countless humanitarians have placed their hopes and dreams for a better future for mankind in 
socialism. But they soon realized that Soviet-style socialism inevitably produced a totalitarianism and a 
disregard for human happiness worse than anything capitalism had ever had. Therefore, many of these socialist 
humanitarians soon began to advocate democratic socialism instead – socialism with a human face. 
Unfortunately for them, democratic socialism can never function as they have hoped. Even if socialism were 
economically rational and feasible, a specifically democratic institutionalization of socialism is politically 
impossible, in the sense that democratic socialism cannot accomplish the goals and purposes set for it. Even if 
democracy were somehow maintained with socialism, either one or the other – socialism or democracy – would 
in reality consist merely of the outward trappings without any of the substance. Either democracy would be 
sham, the freedom to elect one's despotic overlords, or else socialism would be a fraud, nothing but a disorder of 
chaotic interest-group jockeying and pork-barreling without any of the coherent or consistent rhyme or reason 
worthy of any authentic economic plan. Meanwhile, peaceful relations with foreign nations would prove 
impossible. The problem is not abuse of power – betrayal of trust – or economic inefficiency, but a fundamental 
logical incompatibility of means and ends. 
And we must reiterate these facts, for as we noted at the beginning of this essay, those who do not learn 
from history are doomed to repeat it. We cannot assume that students born during the 21st century will have 
learned the lessons of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the failure of actually existent socialism. We must 
understand these lessons ourselves and then painstakingly convey them to our pupils if history is not to repeat 
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itself.
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1 That regulation constitutes de facto nationalization, see Mises (1981 [1922]: 45). That such was done by the 
Nazi regime, see Mises (1974 [1950]: 24f.).
2 Farrant and McPhail (2009: 12, 15) disagree with Caldwell, quoting several statements by Hayek where 
Hayek himself explicitly states that he does believe the welfare state will lead to serfdom (Farrant and 
McPhail 2009: 8, 13f., 15). One thing that should be noted, however, is that sometimes, what Hayek said was 
not that the welfare state itself would lead to totalitarian socialism, but rather, that the ideas underlying the 
welfare state would eventually lead to totalitarian socialism (Farrant and McPhail 2009: 8 n. 11). See further 
next note for more on the dispute between Farrant and McPhail (2009) and Caldwell (in Hayek 2007 [1944]). 
(I thank Vlad Tarko for directing me to Farrant and McPhail [2009].)
3 This emphasis on the operation of the price system is crucial. Farrant and McPhail (2009: 10 n. 17), arguing 
against Hayek's thesis, remark that Hayek approvingly cites Ludwig von Mises’s Kritik des Interventionismus 
(Mises 1996 [1929]; cf. Mises 1998). According to Farrant and McPhail (2009: 10 n. 17), “Mises argues that 
the mixed economy is inherently unstable.” But Farrant and McPhail (2009) do not explore what Hayek's 
citation of Mises really means. Mises's book (Mises 1929; cf. Mises 1998) was written specifically regarding 
price-controls. Mises argued that interventions which controlled prices – setting floors and ceilings – would 
lead to shortages and surpluses which would necessitate additional interventions to fix the problems caused 
by price-controls. Mises argued that one price-control led to another until every price in the entire economy 
was controlled or supplanted by command-and-control, at which point the result would be de facto socialism 
(cf. Mises 1974 [1950]). But Mises's argument does not apply to taxes and subsidies which preserve the 
operation of the price-system. Significantly, in an essay predominately discussing how price-controls lead to 
socialism, Mises briefly criticizes progressive taxation, but his argument is not that progressive taxation leads 
to socialism or totalitarianism, but only that progressive taxation reduces savings and investment and leads to 
capital decumulation (Mises 1974 [1950]:32; cf. Mises 1981 [1922]: 237). Special attention should also be 
paid to a statement by Hayek in a 1976 lecture (Hayek 1984b [1976]) explicitly arguing that his thesis in the 
Road to Serfdom applies not only to central planning but also to redistribution of wealth (Hayek 1984b 
[1976]: 119). This seemingly corroborates Farrant and McPhail's (2009) criticism of Caldwell's (in Hayek 
2007 [1944]) argument that Hayek's Road to Serfdom was not intended to apply to the welfare-state. Farrant 
and McPhail (2009) note that the contemporary welfare state is definitely not totalitarian, and so Hayek is 
apparently wrong. But Hayek (1984b [1976]: 120)'s reason undermines Farrant and McPhail's argument: 
Hayek believes that redistribution of wealth will be accompanied by price-controls on labor in order to 
establish “fair” wage-rates, and so the logic of interventionism will eventually require the government to 
control all prices until it is forced to establish a totalitarian socialist system (cf. Mises 1929 & 1998). An 
entire section of the essay will be devoted to problems of allocating labor in the absence of freely fluctuating 
prices, but for now, it will suffice to say that Hayek seemed to believe that the modern welfare state would 
take us along the road to serfdom only insofar as it rejected the price system. This consideration weighs in 
favor of Caldwell's defense of Hayek (in Hayek 2007 [1944]) against Farrant and McPhail's (2009) criticism.
4 One may examine the measures of economic freedom compiled by the Fraser Institute under its Economic 
Freedom of the World index and come to the same conclusion. For any given year, Sweden has – compared to 
its contemporaries – tended to have low levels of regulation, low trade-barriers, and high degrees of 
protection of private-property, tempered by high levels of taxation and redistribution. This is completely 
unlike the sort of regulatory command-and-control and nationalization to which Hayek's thesis in the Road to 
Serfdom applies.
5 I thank Vlad Tarko for directing me to Lawson and Clark (2010).
6 I thank Willem J. A. van der Deijl for forcing me to clarify this point.
7 If one argues that the workers do not possess enough capital to establish a firm on their own, then this means 
the owner of capital provides a valuable service for which they deserve compensation. Why should the 
capitalist sacrifice their savings and establish a firm if the employees are entitled to appropriate the entire 
firm and shut the capitalist out?
8 Burczak (2011: 136) and Mayer (2001: 231f.) argue that under workplace democracy, instead of the owners 
of capital hiring labor and paying wages, labor would lease capital from its owners. But besides the fact that 
this would outlaw certain voluntary contracts – what Nozick (1974:163) called “capitalist acts between 
consenting adults” – we must point out that it is already legal under free-market capitalism for labor to lease 
capital. Once again, the capitalist utopia subsumes the socialist one.
9 Prychitko (1998) makes two criticisms of Burczak: first, Burczak's “thin” socialism might undesirably 
“thicken” into central planning due to the difficulty of defining the “whole product” to which labor is entitled, 
especially in an interconnected economy where many firms produce intermediate products to be embodied 
later in final consumer goods. Second, Prychitko says, Burczak's own principles converge on a free-market 
libertarian consent theory of justice. According to Burczak, a capital-owner cannot hire labor, but worker self-
managed firms should rent capital. Therefore, a firm cannot hire janitors, but several janitors should join and 
form a self-managed janitorial services firm so that other firms will rent their janitorial services. But what, 
asks Prychitko, happens when a single janitor forms his own self-managed firm of one? According to 
Burczak's principles, this self-managed firm of one should be entitled to rent its capital out to other firms. But 
its capital is nothing other than the single janitor. So if self-managed firms of one laborer are permitted, then 
Burczak's socialism converges on a free-market consent theory of justice. I would add: rather than deciding in 
advance, by a priori logic, whether labor or capital is responsible for and deserving of the “whole product” of 
production, and whether labor or capital is responsible for exercising the entrepreneurial function, we should 
allow markets – meaning consensual social interaction and contract – to discover who is responsible and 
deserves which return (cf. Hayek 2002; Mises 1981 [1922]: 48). 
10 Callari (2009) criticizes Burczak's (2006) workplace democracy for neglecting several traditional Marxian 
critiques of markets, such as the critiques of “commodity fetishism” and the “anarchy of production.” Cf. 
Hayek (1948: 209)'s criticism of market socialism that it is “so thoroughly unorthodox from a socialist point 
of view that one rather wonders whether their authors have not retained too little of the traditional trappings 
of socialist argument to make their proposals acceptable to socialists who are not economists.”
11 Burczak also advocates subsidized credit (2009: 390, 2011: 139) and a guaranteed minimum income (2009: 
392, 2011: 139-144), but this are economic issues beyond the scope of our political discussion. For a criticism 
of subsidized credit, see esp. Lavoie (1985a: 157-160, 173-210).
12 Hayek (1948: 197-199) replied that it would be impossible to deny political officials discretion in the way 
Lange specified, because costs are not as objective as Lange thought, and so higher-level officials would have 
to constantly second-guess the subjective cost accounts of their inferiors. In a different way, Shleifer and 
Vishny [1994] argue that Lange failed to specify what incentive these officials have to faithfully obey Lange's 
system, and so Public Choice government failures will be endemic in the attempted implementation of 
Lange's market socialism. Schweickart (1992: 28) specifies that under economic democracy, there must be 
“socialist entrepreneurs” who innovate, take risks and speculate, making his system remarkably subject to the 
respective criticisms of Hayek and Shleifer-Vishny. When a social entrepreneur's risky innovation turns out to 
have been mistaken, how will the socialist system be able to determine whether this was a responsible risk 
which was worth taking despite its eventual failure – because the failure could not have been foreseen – or 
whether this was an irresponsible risk whose failure the socialist entrepreneur should have foreseen? The 
socialist government must somehow second-guess the socialist entrepreneur's every decision.
13 Cf. Hayek's (1948: 186) criticism of Lange (1938)'s market socialism, taking notice of
how much of the original claim for the superiority of planning over competition is abandoned 
if the planned society is now to rely for the direction of its industries to a large extent on 
competition. Until quite recently, at least, planning and competition used to be regarded as 
opposites, and this is unquestionably still true of nearly all planners except a few economists 
among them. I fear that the schemes of Lange and Dickinson will bitterly disappoint all those 
scientific planners who, in the recent words of B. M. S. Blackett, believe that “the object of 
planning is largely to overcome the results of competition.”
14 In reply to Heilbroner (1978a), Coser (1978) dissents, arguing that the welfare-state is not the capitalist 
system's self-defense against the workers, but quite the opposite: the welfare-state is the hard-won 
achievement of workers who fought to pursue socialist aims. Cf. Walzer (2010).
15 Denitch (1978)'s response to Heilbroner advocates guild socialism or syndicalism, and Heilbroner (1978b: 
360) replies with skeptical sympathy towards Denitch's scheme. But Heilbroner generally refers more to 
planning than to syndicalism.
16 For further analysis of Orwell's views, see Makovi (2015, 2016) and the sources cited therein, especially 
Roback (1985) and Crothers (1994).
17 Shleifer and Vishny cite Olson (1965) and Becker (1983). I would add Stigler (1971); Posner (1974); Butler 
(2012: 36f.); Stevens (1993: 214-229).
18 Cf. Lavoie's (1985a: 131) statement that while advocates of democratic socialism are right to criticize rent-
seeking, their solution to this problem – viz. expanding the government's power over the economy – would 
make the problem worse. A better solution, Lavoie says, is to limit government's ability to bestow privilege 
on anybody and to reduce the number of benefits it has to offer anyone. 
19 For an interesting fictional illustration of how political incentives undermine market socialism, see Spufford 
(2010: 283-299, esp. 292). For a review of Spufford's novel, showing how much historical detail it reliably 
embodies despite its fictional nature, see Henderson (2012-2013).
20 Wilhelm Röpke as well made arguments similar to those of Hayek and Jewkes: see Röpke (1987 [1951]: 24-
35, 1992 [1942]: 83-99, 1998 [1957]: 90-150). However, Röpke's arguments in this area were exceedingly 
brief, and what he did say on our subject, Hayek and Jewkes said in much more detail. Therefore, this essay 
will confine itself to reexamining Hayek and Jewkes. Nevertheless, the interested reader should examine 
Röpke's statements for him- or herself.
21 I could not find any academic citations of Jewkes except for antiquated book reviews. Positive reviews of 
Jewkes include those by Grampp (1949), Levitan (1949), Mackintosh (1949), and Worcester (1978). Mixed 
reviews include Brown (1948), Harris (1949), and Lipson (1949). Negative reviews include Fischer (1949), 
Brewin (1950), Aldcraft (1968), Sutherland (1968), and Lewis (1969). One important criticism made by 
several reviewers – both positive and negative – is that Jewkes failed to realize that his defense of the price-
system and Say's Law was inconsistent with his simultaneous endorsement of Keynesian macroeconomic 
management.
22 That Austrian market process theory is compatible with Public Choice political process theory, see Boettke 
and López (2002) and Ikeda (2003). I thank an anonymous referee for pointing me to these papers.
23 Ludwig von Mises (1981 [1922]: 203f.) also noticed the connection between socialism's attack on 
competition and its unintentional rehabilitation of interest group politics: “In exposing the effects of 
protection, Liberalism broke the aggressive power of particular interests. . . . In order to rehabilitate 
protection, it was necessary to destroy Liberalism. . . . Once Liberalism has been completely vanquished, 
however, and no longer menaces the protective system, there remains nothing to oppose the extension of 
particular privileges.”
24 Two novels offer fictionalized illustrations of this economic principle concerning the allocation of labor under 
capitalism versus socialism: Eugen Richter's Pictures of the Socialistic Future (2010 [1891]) and Henry 
Hazlitt's Time Will Run Back (1966 [1951]); see Makovi (2016). And Cotton pointed out to the author that in 
More's Utopia (1516), people rotate in an out of more desirable and less desirable occupations, and the truly 
onerous work is done by convicts and saints; apparently More too had realized the allocational dilemma 
created by the abolition of differential wages.
25 Cf. another work by the same author, Jewkes (1978)'s A Return to Free Market Economics?: Critical Essays 
on Government Intervention (pp. 67, 70, 84). Jewkes (1978: 84) notes that socialized medicine (specifically 
the British National Health Service) cannot guarantee true equality of access to medical care (which includes 
an egalitarian physical distribution of doctors) unless the government is “prepared to deprive doctors of 
freedom to operate in the district of their own choice.” (On the difficulties which geography imposes on 
egalitarian schemes of distribution, cf. Hoff 1981: 35.) Thomas Szasz (1977: 114) has also called attention to 
the fact that the alleged right to healthcare implies the imposition of corvée: 
Nor is it clear how the concept of a right to treatment can be reconciled with the traditional 
Western concept of of the patient's right to choose his physician. If the patient has a right to 
choose the doctor by whom he wishes to be treated and if he also has a right to treatment, 
then in effect the doctor is the patient's slave.
Similarly, Nigel Ashford (2001: 46) notes, “A meaningful right to health care would create an obligation on 
the medical profession to provide that care, regardless of the wishes of doctors and nurses, thus denying them 
freedom.” Of course, the government could pay doctors a premium to incentivize them to voluntarily relocate 
to less desirable districts, but then there would be inequality of income, which seems incompatible with 
socialism. Or the government could distribute health vouchers to its citizens, each worth an identical amount 
of money, so that everyone can afford the same number of dollars of healthcare. But then citizens with 
different medical conditions and living in different districts would obtain different levels of healthiness and 
care for the same number of dollars; once again, there would be inequality.
26 According to editor Bruce Caldwell (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 47 note 19), “Hayek refers to the Control of 
Engagement Order of 1947,” and his summary of that law makes it clear that he refers to the same law as 
does Jewkes. In a 1994 preface to the Road to Serfdom, Milton Friedman agreed that this law confirmed 
Hayek (see Hayek 2007: 261). For a detailed summary and analysis of this law, see Farrant (2015), who is 
more sanguine about this law than are Hayek, Jewkes, and Friedman.
27 Moreover, Babeuf would have regimented and regulated even leisure (Talmon 1960: 247) just as the fascist 
and communist countries later would (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 132n6, 177).
28 Given Orwell's dedication to upholding democratic socialism as an alternative to totalitarianism and the 
“Soviet myth,” one wonders how he was able to utter these words without undergoing a crushing crisis of 
faith. But Newsinger notes (1999:139) that “Labour Government on this occasion seems to have brought out 
the worst in him [Orwell].” For a more sympathetic interpretation of what Orwell meant, see Farrant (2015).
29 I thank Vlad Tarko for referring me to Lawson and Clark (2010).
30 Friedman (1962: 16f.) and Jewkes (1968 [1948]: 198) both note as well that when the state is the sole 
employer, citizens will be afraid to criticize the government lest they lose their jobs (cf. Rothbard 1977: 26).
31 Of course, this essay disagrees with Heilbroner's caveat that “Command by planning need not, of course, be 
totalitarian.” But Heilbroner concedes that socialism is authoritarian, and so his concession means more to 
our thesis than his caveat. 
32 Heilbroner is also quoted in Boaz (2005, 2016). For empirical verification of Heilbroner (1978a: 347, 1986: 
126)'s statements about the correlation between political and economic liberty, see Lawson and Clark (2010).
33 Cf. Boettke and Leeson (2002: 12). As for why socialism “necessarily involves the use of power which 
cannot be guided by fixed rules,” see Hayek, “Planning and the Rule of Law,” in Hayek (2007 [1944]: 112-
123). The socialist Jacob Marschak (Hayek 2007 [1944]): 17) called this particular chapter “excellent and 
truly inspiring” (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 251).
34 Mises (1981 [1922]: 60f.) also considered democracy a means, not an end: “The significance of the 
democratic form of constitution is not that it represents more nearly than any other the natural and inborn 
rights of man [nor] . . . is [it] to be explained by the fact that democracy is worthy of love for its own sake. 
The fact is that it performs functions which he [the citizen] is not prepared to do without.” Democracy is 
merely instrumental. For Mises (ibid.), the purpose of democracy is to enable peaceful transition of power 
and make violent revolution unnecessary. But Mises (ibid.) does not expect democracy to necessarily elect 
preferable political officials nor select superior political policies compared to any other constitutional form.
35 Dahl's (1985) argument for workplace democracy appears to make democracy constitutive of the good as 
well. Dahl argues that we all have a right to democracy even more than we have a right to economic liberty 
(see Adamson 1989: 127-192, Mayer 2001: 230). For Dahl, workplace democracy “is a matter of right” and 
”Dahl [has] shifted the debate about workplace democracy from the question of its consequences to the 
question of what justice demands” (Mayer 2001: 222). It seems that for Dahl, our right to democracy is not 
contingent on whether democracy is instrumentally useful for accomplishing other ends; democracy is its 
own end. Dahl justifies workplace democracy by arguing that a workplace is like a polity, and that just as a 
polity must be governed democratically, so too a workplace. (Incidentally, Meyer [2001: 236-247] replies that 
since employees are not forced to obtain employment by any given employer, but are free to choose whether 
and where to seek employment, their rights are not violated if they are not offered any democratic control of 
the firm.)
36 Mises (1981 [1922]: 71) disagrees, arguing that a democratic but illiberal regime is preferable to an 
authoritarian liberal regime because a frustrated illiberal majority of the people will turn to violent revolution. 
This is related to Mises's (1981 [1922]: 60f.) view that the purpose of democracy is not to promote better 
policies but only to prevent violent revolution by providing for a peaceful transition of political power. 
Apparently, Mises thinks it is better for a minority to surrender to an irrational mob than to attempt resistance. 
He seems to be offering the political equivalent of the notion that it is often better for an individual to 
surrender to a mugger than to resist. Mises counsels the path of least resistance, and for Mises, the solution to 
illiberal democracy is not to compel the people to accept a liberal, undemocratic regime against their wills, 
but to convince them to freely elect a liberal regime. Bryan Caplan (2011 passim) highlights Mises's belief 
that one way or another – by election or by violent revolution – the majority will eventually prevail, and 
therefore, Mises held, the desideratum is to convince the majority to make better choices by educating them; 
cf. Caplan and Stringham (2005).
37 This may buttress Buchanan's and Tullock's argument for qualified majority parliamentary voting in Calculus  
of Consent (1962). If Hayek is right that government ought to act only where there is agreement, this might 
imply that all legislation should command the support of a super-majority. For reviews of Buchanan's and 
Tullock's argument, cf. Butler (2012: 95-100), Stevens (1993: 134-139), and Hinich and Munger (1997: 100-
103).
38 Shleifer and Vishny cite Olson (1965) and Becker (1983). I would add Stigler (1971), Posner (1974), Butler 
(2012: 36f.), and Stevens (1993: 214-229).
39 I thank Tom G. Palmer for making this point in conversation.
40 Similarly, Talmon (1960: 35, 264) argues that Hobbes, Rousseau, and Marx all illegitimately defined their 
respective states as being non-oppressive. In conversation, Lode Cossaer pointed out to me that “the current 
(non-classical liberal) literature on federalism hasn’t learned the lesson that one can’t merely posit institutions 
and then decide what the outcome will be. The literature is dominated by ‘mere’ normative ideas.” Similarly, 
Brennan (2014: 62-64) discusses what he calls “the other Cohen fallacy” of “identifying regimes with values 
or motives.”  According to Brennan, G. A. Cohen defines both socialism and capitalism as comprising both 
institutions and motives: socialism is both common ownership of the means of production and moral virtue, 
and capitalism is both private property and greed. Brennan (2014: 63) insists that capitalism and socialism are 
institutions only, producing whatever practical consequences they do, and that they must be analytically 
distinguished from motives and intentions. Brennan (2014: 64) concludes, “We cannot just decide to insert 
evil motivations into the very definition of capitalism in order to argue that capitalism is evil. That would be 
both bad philosophy and bad lexicography.”
41 Mises's analysis in (1985 [1944]) is very similar to what he wrote previously in (1983 [1919]). The difference 
is one work was written following WWI and the other, in response to WWII. His later work is more mature 
and detailed, but his earlier work is valuable as well. See also Mises (1990: 137-165) for another expression 
of a similar argument. Mises (1981 [1922]: 205-208) makes a surprisingly different argument.
42 Hints at a similar analysis are offered by Jewkes (1968: 111, 218, 223, 234, 236).
43 Talmon (1960: 239) indicates that Babeuf's communistic scheme for France was averse to international trade 
as well. The motivation here was slightly different: foreign commodities were demoralizing (Talmon 1960: 
239; cf. Mises 1981 [1922]: 197). “[T]he cosmopolitan Babouvist creed preached extreme national isolation” 
(Talmon 1960: 244) in order “to safeguard the regenerated people 'against the contagion of pernicious 
examples which might otherwise enervate the force of manners, and the love of equality'” (Talmon 1960: 
245). Granted, this national isolationism did not imply for Babeuf the use of military force against foreigners 
(Talmon 1960: 245). Nevertheless, “[f]ree intercourse with other states would not be entered upon so long as 
they had not adopted the principles of France” (Talmon 1960: 245). Time and again, socialism consistently 
implies national isolation lest foreigners interfere with the delicately and scrupulously laid plans of the 
masterminds. In the case of Babeuf's France, the “plan” was ideological and cultural, not economic, but the 
basic principle is the same: no government may plan conditions – economic or cultural – in its own country 
unless the citizens are isolated from relations with foreigners.
